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On behalf of all of us in FBIS I wish to express appreciation to our readers who have guided our efforts throughout the years.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSSR'S TREATMENT OF MINORITIES DISCUSSED

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 21 Nov 80 p 4

[Article by Jaroslav Mesko: "Minority Equal Rights in Practice: Rapid Development of Nationally Mixed Okreses in the Sixth Five-Year Plan"]

[Text] According to our constitution, and consistent with Lenin's principles on national minority policies, every citizen of our country is free to determine his nationality in accordance with his convictions. Membership in a particular nationality may not be a detriment to any citizen in his political, economic or social life. Commensurate with the interests of their national development, residents of Hungarian or Ukrainian nationality living in Slovakia are guaranteed, by our laws, the right to education in their language, to full cultural development, the use of their language in relations with agencies in regions inhabited by the particular nationality and the right of association in national, cultural and social organizations.

The observance of these principles is closely watched and evaluated regularly. Recently the SSR Government analyzed these questions. Through proper implementation of the policy on national minorities and by increased efforts of SSR central agencies, national committees and also national cultural unions of Hungarian and Ukrainian workers in Slovakia further clear advances were achieved in the economic and social standards of the region where the population of mixed nationalities resides. The economic backwardness inherited from the past in the southern and eastern okreses has been overcome in the years of the socialist construction. A number of okreses with mixed populations--Roznava, Levice, Humenne, Rimavska Sobota--now surpass the overall Slovak average in the level of economic activity of their inhabitants. The Sixth Five-Year Plan and implementation of the election programs of the National Front considerably expanded working opportunities in these okreses and enriched them with new factories, servicing plants and health facilities and extended their educational system.

However, let us get to the specifics. In the Lucenec okres, for example, Kovosmalt of Filakovo was remodeled and modernized during the Sixth Five-Year Plan at a cost of Kcs 132 million, a plant for producing tiles was built in Lucenec at a cost of Kcs 381 million, a plant for the production of commercial glass in Poltar and a

pottery works in Tomasovce were built, etc. The Dunajská Streda okres gained a heavy engineering plant and a bakery for Kcs 71 million, production at the Tesla plant was expanded, the construction of a new meat combine for Kcs 166 million was started and the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros system of water works is under construction. As a third okres let us mention Rimavska Sobota and its acquisitions during the Sixth Five-Year Plan: a clothing plant in Safarikov, a meat combine, freezing plant and a mill in Rimavska Sobota, new installations of a lime kiln in Tisovec, a brick factory in Safarikov and an engineering plant for spare parts made from unfinished construction in Rimavska Sobota with a budgeted cost of Kcs 217 million which will add almost 900 job opportunities in industry, a plant for shaping machines in Safarikov and one for producing synthetic rubber in Hnusti, etc.

Such new opportunities together with the development of agricultural production, which includes the okreses in the south of Slovakia as among the most productive in the country, were reflected, for example, in a growth rate of retail sales in okreses with mixed populations that is more rapid than the per person average in Slovakia over the last 10 years. In the okres of Velky Krtis, for example, the retail trade doubled in 8 years and almost as much in the okreses of Dunajská Streda, Svidnik and Komarno. It is not by chance that modern hospital complexes which greatly raise the level of health services are being completed precisely in Kosice and the okreses of Nove Zamky, Galanta, Svidnik and Roznava, and that an extensive new hospital with polyclinic was turned over to authorities in Trebisov.

The right of citizens of Hungarian and Ukrainian nationality to education and instruction in their native language is assured by schooling for these nationalities beginning with kindergartens with instruction in Hungarian for almost 16,000 children and 73 kindergartens with instruction in Ukrainian for 2,200 children. The system also includes elementary schools with instruction in Hungarian for almost 51,400 pupils, 11 secondary schools with 2,863 students and 50 more classes with 1,400 students where instruction is in Hungarian, 6 intermediate technical schools teaching in this language and 15 more intermediate technical schools have classes with instruction in Hungarian. Young apprentices--over 4,500 of Hungarian nationality--have the opportunity to prepare themselves for skilled working careers in their native language. With this extent of schooling in Hungarian, education for these nationals is essentially complete. However, it will be necessary to take care of the problem of the lag in qualifications of the teachers--instruction in Hungarian is given by 93.1 percent of the elementary school teachers, 87.2 percent of the technical school teachers, but only 85.2 percent of the technical school teachers. Likewise, greater attention will have to be given to the mastery of Slovak as a prerequisite for successful adaptation to living in okreses without mixed nationalities and for advanced education. In the last school year, for example, of 1,247 secondary school graduates of Hungarian nationality who applied for advanced education, 727 were accepted, which is 5.4 percent of the total number of students accepted. This is somewhat more than in preceding years, but still low in comparison with the proportion of citizens of Hungarian nationality of the total population. There were 236 graduates of Ukrainian nationality applying for advanced schooling and 164 were accepted, which is 1.14 percent of the total number accepted.

Education for nationals in the Ukrainian language is represented here by 73 kindergartens for 2,159 children, 27 elementary schools for 1,733 pupils, as well as other schools where over 7,700 pupils are instructed in subjects in Ukrainian. One secondary and 10 classes in 3 others enable students to obtain secondary education in the Ukrainian language and also in 8 intermediate technical schools.

Members of national minorities also have appropriate representation on national committees and legislative bodies. Of the total representation in Slovakia, Hungarian nationals make up 9 percent of the KNV [Kraj National Committee] representatives, 11.3 percent of the ONV [Okres National Committee] representatives and 13.4 percent of the MNV [Local National Committee] representatives. Representatives of Ukrainian nationality make up 3.4 percent of the total number of KNV representatives, 3 percent of the ONV and 3.3 percent of the MNV representatives. The analysis further confirmed that in towns with populations of mixed nationalities bilingual designations are used and opportunity is afforded to take care of one's legitimate interests at national committees, courts or state notary offices in one's native language. Together with a fully developed national culture, members of Hungarian and Ukrainian nationalities living in Slovakia thus enjoy broad opportunities to exercise their rights and responsibilities in the same way as other citizens.

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DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER ON ARMED FORCES 'CLASS MISSION'

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 6, 1980 signed to press 11 Sep 80 pp 281-283

[Lead article by Col Gen W. Fleissner, deputy minister for national defense: "On the 25th Anniversary of the Founding of the National People's Army (NVA): The Military Class Mission Will Be Reliably Accomplished Also in the 1980's!"]

[Text] Our army approaches its 25th anniversary at a time which is marked primarily by the determined struggle of the community of socialist nations and of all peace-loving forces in the world for safeguarding and expanding the successes in the policy of detente which have been reached in the 1970's.

The Warsaw Pact states have been true to their principles and yet flexible in carrying out their coordinated foreign, security and military policies. "The greatest success of the past decades is the fact that they succeeded in breaking the tragic cycle in which peace was merely a breathing pause between world wars, and in initiating a large-scale effort to banish war from human society forever."¹

This longest period of peace in European history up to now not only proves that socialism creates peace, it also graphically confirms that socialism needs peace. The major economic successes of the community of socialist states--above all the huge investments designed to further expand its material-technical foundation and assure raw material supply while simultaneously achieving unequaled social progress--would have been unthinkable without a secure peace.

In the GDR also, the time since the Eighth SED Party Congress in 1971 has been the most successful in the more than 30-year history of our socialist state. Based on results of work done in the past decades, our economic strength was considerably increased during those years. A few data shall make this clear:

In 1950, one day's production resulted in M127 million worth of industrial goods. In 1980, it has risen to M1.2 billion. This represents a tenfold increase.

A 1 percent growth in industrial goods production represents to us today a value of almost M3.5 billion, which ultimately represents a usable finished product for society.

1. Declaration of Warsaw Pact nations, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 16 May 1980, p 3.

Being successfully realized is the extensive program of social policy measures--with the residential construction program at its center--which had been decided on at the Eighth SED Party Congress. The unity that exists between economic policy and social policy serves to accomplish the main goal. All working people of our nation, as well as members of the NVA [National People's Army] and the GDR Border Troops, have recognized that consistently higher economic achievements lead to a higher standard of living. Members of the armed forces know that this great program can prosper only during peacetime. For that reason, securing the peace militarily is to them both a great obligation and a mission of honor. Decisions made at the Ninth SED Party Congress have turned more and more into reality in our everyday life: "The protection of peace and of the socialist fatherland and its achievements, as well as the defense of the GDR, are the right and honorary duty of every GDR citizen."² This ranges all the way from socialist military training to defense missions in the economy. Without this solid hinterland, our army could not accomplish its objectivity increasing tasks. For this reason, on this 25th anniversary of the NVA it is especially the working class and all GDR workers who deserve our sincere gratitude for their achievements and their willingness to give and to sacrifice in the interest of a strong and reliable socialist national defense with the NVA as its nucleus.

The arms race that had been forced by the imperialist NATO nations in the mid-1970's has forced the socialist nations to use for the protection of peace and of socialism financial and material means which correspond to the degree of the threat. Under the influence of the military industrial complex of the United States and other NATO nations, the imperialist governments are attempting to gain military superiority and thus to make radical changes in the existing--approximate--military balance in Europe and in the world. It can be seen clearer and clearer that the reactionary circles of imperialism are attempting to intensify the international situation and are entering upon a course of confrontation. This turns the military factor into the key factor.

United States imperialism is making great efforts to develop its strategic offensive potential further. After years of preparation, and decisively supported by the FRG and Great Britain, NATO made the fateful missile decision on 12 December 1979. NATO's long-term armament program constitutes the largest armament program in its history. The forced confrontation policy brings with it serious dangers for all peace-loving mankind.

Frustrating imperialist intrigues demands the greatest alertness and an always high degree of combat preparedness. The community of socialist states, led by the Soviet Union, has in the past appropriately rebuffed all imperialist schemes and intrigues against peace and the independence of nations, and it shall continue to do so in the future as well. The NVA has always proven to be the reliable military instrument of power of the working class and all GDR workers, as well as a respected, equal and reliable partner in the Warsaw Pact defense coalition.

The "Comrades-in-Arms 80" maneuvers have shown this again. They not only documented great combat strength and combat preparedness but also reflected in many way the unity of party, people and army that exists in socialism. Above all, the maneuvers were an

2. SED Program "Berlin, 1976, p 63.

expression of the close class and arms alliance that exists between the NVA, the Soviet army and the other fraternal armies. In the many meetings that took place between the general secretary and the Politburo of our party with NVA soldiers and the soldiers of other fraternal armies, the solid trust and the conviction could be felt that under the leadership of the party of the working class, the cause of peace is in good hands. The maneuvers showed the increased level of development of the NVA members, who proved with outstanding achievements that they are capable of making excellent use of combat technology for the protection of peace.

Our socialist armies are an essential part of the worker state. This is ultimately the reason for their superiority. This was also clearly shown by the maneuvers.

The unity between people and army and the high degree of combat and operational preparedness are a convincing expression of the efforts by all NVA members to approach the 10th SED Party Congress well prepared with high achievements in political and military training as well as the mastery of modern military technology. The increasing leadership ability of commanders and staff officers will be a reliable basis. In preparation for this, the 25th anniversary of the NVA is for us members of the armed forces an occasion and an obligation to show our contribution to the building of the developed socialist GDR society, to the reliable protection of the peoples of our community of socialist states, and at the same time to prepare ourselves in all ways for the tasks which the 10th SED Party Congress will demand for the further strengthening of national defense.

The focus will remain on those problems which are the results of the military modernization process that will continue on far into the 1980's. We can approach these tasks from a secure foundation that rests on the rich experiences gathered during the NVA's 25-year history. The most important experiences and, at the same time, prerequisites of our successful development are these:

1. Leadership by the working class party was and remains the foundation of our worker and peasant army which represents the class interests of the worker and peasant state and is therefore very closely allied with the people. The party has always done what was necessary militarily and politically at the right time in its struggle to secure peace and the reliable protection of socialism. The SED Central Committee saw to it that the NVA received a modern organization, structure and arms and has educated, trained and led it from the very beginning to be a coalition army. The steadily growing class character of our army and its closeness to the working people is one of the greatest merits of the party. For the first time in the history of our people, it created a true people's army which serves the vital interests of the workers and of social progress. It can therefore be justifiably said that the scientific leadership by the party of the working class is the decisive source of the NVA's power and combat strength.

2. The solid class and arms alliance with the armed forces of the USSR and the continuous development of the comradeship-in-arms with all armies of the Warsaw Pact nations are tokens of our successes. In all these years, the NVA was able to fulfill its military class mission reliably at all times because of its strong class and arms alliance with the Soviet army and the other fraternal armies. The entire structure of the NVA, its development into a modern socialist coalition army, is inseparably linked to fraternal cooperation with the Soviet army, to internationalist assistance from the strongest and most experienced military power of the Warsaw Pact to the

youngest army of our defense alliance. If our military leadership cadres have now mastered modern military skills, if our soldiers have mastered complex weapons systems, as was demonstrated anew in the "Comrade-in Arms 80" maneuvers, then this is a concrete and visible result of the effective and efficient cooperation between our armies.

We commemorate the NVA's 25th anniversary on the eve of our 10th party congress. This gives us occasion to render an account to everyone on how the class mission received from the Ninth SED Party Congress has been fulfilled and to determine our new mission. Based on the firm foundation of our party's military policy and the high level of readiness of our soldiers, we must now aim at further advancements in the socialist competition, the pledge movement and the mass initiatives.

The 25th anniversary of the NVA comes at the beginning of a new five-year plan which will bring with it, among other things, additional changes in the NVA's supply of modern technology and equipment. The most important points here are that all military and technological tasks awaiting us involve problems of troop leadership, i.e., human leadership. Tasks must be solved with fewer personnel in part and in shorter time spans; progressive automation places increasing demands on our people. We must all adjust to this. It is therefore necessary to specify the necessary tasks in all areas of military life, in the political-ideological work, in training, in the operation, maintenance and care of technology. It is important to place prime emphasis on the mastery of modern military technology and to quickly put good experiences to general use in the interest of an ever-greater effectiveness and quality in training and technical security. Every soldier can also contribute in this way to the assurance of a high level of combat strength and combat preparedness.

The 11th and 12th Central Committee plenary sessions of our party concentrated on the fact that the ever more complex conditions presented by the continued building of the developed socialist society and the securing of peace in all areas of social life require better than average achievements. This also applies to all members of the armed forces as well as the NVA's civilian employees, both with regard to the existing relationship among politics, economy and national defense as well as each individual contribution to the increased combat strength and combat preparedness of all units of all the armed forces and branches. This means primarily that a higher quality of work and increased efficiency in the entire military must be achieved in all areas. A high degree of effectiveness in military-technical work means for us that maximal use must be made of technological progress for national defense.

Increased quality and effectiveness are shown in the improved capability of modern combat technology, in its increased reliability and thus increased combat value. Greater efficiency requires above all improved mastery of the technology, better operation and maintenance and thus more intensive training. Only this creates the prerequisites for military utilization of the combat and performance characteristics inherent in the technology.

The main sources for further lowering the material and financial expense must be found within the army--without, however, permitting a reduction in combat readiness. Only here can expert judgments be made as to which material and financial means are required to comply with the NVA's mission. To achieve the necessary progress, a new quality of military-economic thought and action must be realized at all echelons. It suffices no longer to be thrifty in the traditional sense. Of course it continues to be important to reduce the use of fuel, lubricants, energy and heating material, spare parts and materials of all types. The numerous initiatives in socialist

competition--for example, the "I drive the cheapest kilometer"--the results of innovator work and of the "Fair of the Masters of Tomorrow" movement, as well as daily disciplined work by our civilian employees and those in workshops and camps, contribute a great deal to the effective use of the financial and material means designated for national defense to achieve added increases in combat strength and combat preparedness. Nor do we wish to or will we forgo these important sources of good material economy and reliable combat strength in the future. It must continue to be an important concern of all party, FDJ and trade union organizations to orient their members through goal-directed political-ideological work toward solving questions of military economy.

On the other hand, in political-ideological work every achievement and every deed which is above the median, above average, must be popularized in order to raise the mass of soldiers and civilian employees to the level of the very best in their willingness and capacity to achieve. We need an above-average improvement in performance in all areas. That requires achievements which cannot be reached routinely, which will result in gaining time and make positive changes in the existing standards of combat training and in other areas, which will result in a saving of financial and material means of all kinds and, last but not least, lead to an overall higher effectiveness and quality of work in the interest of national defense.

Beginning on 1 December is the new training year which will be marked by the 10th SED Party Congress, the 25th anniversary of the NVA and also by the start of the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan. All these events will exert a great influence on the further development of the NVA.

In view of the intensified international class struggle, the NVA faces at the beginning of the 1980's, growing demands for fulfillment of its military class mission of assuring peaceful conditions for the further advance of socialism in the GDR. The growing severity of the class struggle with imperialism, and especially its ever more scrupulous psychological war against socialism, demand from all military personnel an increasing ideological steadfastness. But also the revolution in military affairs, which is continuing and entering a new phase, must be dealt with primarily on an ideological basis, not by a one-time or occasional propaganda campaign, but rather on a continuous basis.

Every new technology represents first of all an ideological challenge to our people, their readiness for making full use of the potential of new weapons systems and equipment. Everyone knows that differing results are reached with identical weapons and identical technology if the degree of training of those using them does not follow a uniform standards. The same is true if we ignore the fact that the main purpose of new technology is to give man the possibility of reaching higher goals, instead of settling for reaching the same goals and standards, only with greater ease.

The vast majority of our soldiers have recognized that modern combat, leadership and security technology results in the necessary increase in combat strength and combat preparedness only if they are used and maintained with a political sense of responsibility, great military mastery and a high degree of discipline and order.

The 25th anniversary of the NVA is for us an occasion to assure our Marxist-Leninist party and the GDR workers that we will honorably fulfill our class mission in solid comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet army and the other fraternal armies in the 1980's as well. The party and the working class can be assured that the protection of socialism and of peace is in safe hands.

WORK OF PARTY SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE SUMMARIZED

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 23 Jan 81 p 4

[Article by Denes Kovacs in the column "From the Workshops of Hungarian Science": "Modern Sociological Research; A Visit in the Sociological Research Institute"]

[Text] The Sociological Research Institute of the MSZMP Central Committee began its work to function 13 years ago. Its establishment was not accompanied by a lot of publicity, and the first steps of the researchers was watched by a certain amount of caution and skepticism in professional circles. There were some who posed the question: whether there was a need for a new sociological research institute given the fact that institutes with longstanding tradition were and experience--disciplinary i.e., organized according to scientific disciplines--already functioning effectively in the whole domain of social sciences. After the first years of searching for direction and the establishment of specific methods, however, the new institute justified its existence, and today it has a recognized position in the network of sociological research institutes.

Teamwork and Flexible Organization

The results and accomplishments can be explained, in addition to many other factors, particularly by those characteristics that separate the activities, the internal organization, methods, and the cadre conditions of the Sociological Research Institute from the so-called traditional research institutes in spite of the similarity of their main features.

These features in question affecting the whole of scientific life and research work are regarded today by scientific policy and scientific organization as general principles. These principles are: successful coupling of individual research with collective research, the precedence of teamwork, the close cooperation of researchers with different training, i.e., interdisciplinarity, a complex, multi-directional approach to real social, economic, and cultural movements. This is made possible by the fact that amongst the approximately 40 researchers of the institute--20 of whom have academic degrees--economists as well as historians, philosophers, sociologists, lawyers, and statisticians can be found. Added to it is an institutional infrastructure that is not ossified but capable of flexible adaptation to topics and individual tasks, thereby making possible not only

a better concentration of researchers but also a systematic involvement in research work of outside experts with the best knowledge of a research item.

Thus the Sociological Research Institute is ahead of its time in a sense which is not exclusively the merit of leaders and staff. This means that the new tasks prescribed for the Institute have induced the researchers to employ new approaches and methods. This is understandable, after all, the most important functions of the Institute--under the guidance of the leading organs of the Party--are the investigation of contemporary socio-political issues, the execution of requisite theoretical and empirical research and the concentration of domestic capabilities to give assistance to the leading organs of the Party to prepare comprehensive socio-political decisions.

Five Main Research Directions

In accordance with these objectives, important basic research has been going on at the Institute during the past decade among others about the ideological issues of the development of national social structure and political system, the position and role of councils, the experience of the educational system, but also empirical sociological research has also been done on the situation of the working class, the life style and cultural situation of certain working-class strata, the role and realization of democracy in factories, and the situation of the rural intelligentsia as well as that of Budapest.

The research topics enumerated above, as well as a lot of other research, fit well into the 5 main themes whose investigation was set for the Institute in the last plan period by the leading organs of the Party. Today at the conclusion of the plan period the results can be assessed and the main features of the activity of the Institute can be characterized as well.

Within the theme the development of the state and democracy, the position of social organizations, and especially the representative role of trade unions, the socio-political functions of the parliament and local councils as well as the representative system in the system of exercising political power was investigated; the concept and contents of political system were analyzed; the mechanism of socialist democracy was dealt with, especially the characteristics, the nature, and accounting for of various interests, and the issues of confrontation, reconciliation, representation, and classification of these interests. Within the theme characteristics of developed socialist society, the historical position of socialism, society's productive forces, certain issues of social equality and collectivization as well as the general laws and national characteristics of developed socialist society were investigated.

Furthermore, an important area of investigation was the change of Hungarian social structure and its relationship to socialist consciousness. Within this, staff researchers of the Institute dealt mainly with the problems of the coming closer of social classes, the issues of social equality and inequality and their reflection in the consciousness.

Within the theme investigation of certain ideological movements of our time, mainly the critique of technocratic theories was worked up and new trends of bourgeois ideology were investigated. Finally, within the framework of youth research among others the educational-instructional system, the process of becoming a worker, and the assimilation into society of young skilled workers was analyzed.

Indicative of these accomplishments is the fact that in the last 10 years the researchers of the Institute have published more than 200 significant studies, books, and monographs and they collaborated in the issuance of 18 collective works and collections of articles published abroad. Sociological Research Reports, a quarterly periodical of the Institute has been gaining a good reputation in professional circles. International recognition of their work is borne out by the fact that in 5 years 360 foreign guests have been received by the Institute, while the staff participated in more than 100 foreign party and scientific programs while the Institute itself organized about 30 international conferences.

International Relations

Within the context of its international relations, the Institute has developed especially close collaboration with similar institutes of socialist countries. It coordinates international research on several topics--among others the development of socialist democracy--on the basis of ideological cooperation of the fraternal parties of socialist countries.

It is participating in the research of topics entitled the rapprochement of the working class and technological intelligentsia and the career of youth in socialism as well as in common empirical sociological research of several socialist countries. In addition, it has developed constructive working relationships with the theoretical institutes and staff of Italian, French, West German, Greek, and English fraternal parties as well as with several social democratic research institutes, i.e., the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the research institutes of Belgian and Dutch social democratic parties.

The Institute is an organic part of the life of Hungarian sociological science and the system of sociological research. It takes an active part in the realization of long-term and medium-term research plans and in the investigation of several topics; it has a central, coordinating role in the investigation of several structure, the political system of socialism, the social relationships of the educational system, and in youth research. The staff of the Institute have important functions in scientific public life, they sit on academic and other scientific committees and on editorial boards of ideological and theoretical periodicals.

The Sociological Research Institute endeavours in the course of its activities to focus its research on tasks with the most important practical applications, and through the utilization of the results of research to assist the leading organs of the Party in laying the scientific foundation of political positions and decisions and in the formulations of important directives. At this

juncture, we can allude to the drafting of important documents, e.g., the collaboration in the preparation of the Act of Councils and constitutional reform.

The Institute is striving to realize the tasks laid down in the science policy directives of the Central Committee, and accordingly does not evade the examination of often delicate issues related to our contemporary social and economic problems.

This is required by the leadership but difficulties can also issue from it. It is not always easy to recognize the problems posed by practice in time and since often the untrodden path has to be taken, it is not easy to choose the methods to be applied either. All this makes the practical applications of research findings difficult. Some problems also arise from the open structure of the Institute: it is difficult to match individual research ambitions with the requirement for common pursuit of individual topics. A recurrent problem is also the fact that every 5 years the research themes of the Institute are modified to comply with the requirement of the leading organs of the Party: certain investigations are terminated and new assignments have to be launched. This is the present situation now that efforts have to be focused--in part as a continuation of previous work--on main research themes that are of concern in the next 5 years.

CSO: 2500

SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY NEEDED TO MOBILIZE HUMAN RESERVES

Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 25 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by Imre Pozsgay, Minister of Culture: "Socialist Democracy and Political Culture"]

[Text] Competition has been going on for a long time now over the question of what social order can give adequate perspectives and a sensible life to today's modern man. The existence of socialism and its spread over the world gives in itself an answer to this question. Its continuance shows that liberation and the elimination of exploitation is possible in the life of modern people. It shows at the same time that by applying a theory and method built on an understanding of the laws of social reality we can foresee and plan for the most basic social processes. Goals that are foreseeable and can be targeted are attained by conscious activity, by the political guidance of a party theoretically prepared, and by the cooperation of organizations and movements expressing the interests of various classes and groups among the people.

For the Development of Potentials

Attendant on the history of socialism, however, is the fact that it has been followed on its defined path from time to time by serious contradictions, and sometimes by shocks and crises. It has happened that because of the subjective faults of the leadership and power distortions the most conscientious political force itself, the Marxist-Leninist party, was unable to fulfill its guiding function adequately.

These contradictory phenomena and operational disturbances, which last for varying lengths of time, can always give sufficient reason and cause for attacks against socialism by exploiting the world economic crisis which is also affecting us adversely, and our enemies are again linking cold war pressure to broad-scale and sometimes successful propaganda for their ideologies. They are counting on confused ideologies which continue to live in part of the population, on bad habits, and on the fact that we ourselves are frequently to blame because we fail to convert by ideological analysis the contradictions or the entirely natural conflicts which are also to be found in socialism, and we do not arrive at a convincing theoretical generalization at an appropriate level.

Throughout its history socialism has been built under the pressure of its own contradictions and the attacks of its enemies. It is no different today. One can respond in different ways to this situation. I believe the correct response is given when we work on the possibilities for the development of socialism by relying on socialist bases. That is, the polemics with capitalism must, above all, be practical so that on the basis of practice the new and ever new theory reflecting this situation will be convincing and point toward new practical deeds. Only the theoretical generalization of practical experiences can offer defense against a practicicism of narrow visionary scope and against allowing the enemy to take over certain areas of intellectual life.

Socialism should be attractive for people not only when it reaps success after success but also in difficult times. If we succeed in awakening in people a sense of responsibility toward those values which the new society has already created, if we succeed in giving them tasks which coincide with actual and personal efforts to defend these values, if we succeed in implanting the values of the national past into the vital questions of the national present and future, then we may succeed also in moving an entire country ahead in difficult times according to the dual requirements of homeland and progress.

The continuous development of socialist democracy offers the best political conditions for fulfilling this requirement. A socialist democracy which develops under conditions that are appropriately clarified both theoretically and politically fulfills a number of important functions; in respect to perspectives it prepares politically man's full liberation and at the same time in our day it gives people experience of participation as citizens, and it creates the political environment most appropriate for the capability and consciousness of present man to promote economic activity.

The history of socialism has shown, and may still show, many variations in the political forms of the system. Our historical course developed in such a way that our society is being organized for its common goals under the guidance of a single Marxist-Leninist party, and it is also in this framework that democracy is developing. Thus the development of socialist democracy must take place according to the common legitimacy of socialism and according to individual national and cultural characteristics and its most important political principles. Such democratization, guided by the party according to the above principles, meets the interests of an entire society because it gives the people the security they rightfully demand for themselves while at the same time guarantees the country's progress.

To the extent that we are proceeding with the democratization of a socialist society, it is to the same extent that a study of political culture becomes more and more important. We must answer the question of what political consciousness, habits and feelings are held by the groups that follow various interests, values and goals developed on common socialist bases, by leaders and the led, and by the people included in the work distribution system. Do the political organizations and institutions appropriately express the interests of the classes, sub-classes, and work distribution groups that have grown from socialist soil, but still their own characteristic interests, and the psychological and attitudinal demands of

these interests? Do they make it possible thereby to select the most progressive interests and on this basis integrate all the other interests with the party's guidance? Only a person who or a community which correctly recognizes and represents self-interests can recognize long term, social interests. We must realize the Marxist idea that individual interests already contain social interests.

The Characteristics of Our Political Culture

Political culture does not simply mean what people know about political goals, or what the level of their political knowledge is, but rather whether they know how to politicize and how they cultivate politics based on common interests. The development of political culture is first of all a question of public educational and an institutional development. Here too that simple wisdom is valid that one can only learn to swim in water. Enlightenment and education can arouse an interest in swimming, but only upon encountering water--an elemental force--does it become clear whether abstract learning, in our example the theoretical knowledge of swimming, is real knowledge. Someone learning to swim can theoretically learn the positions and motions which he must use in the water, but he must step into the water and at the same time accept the instructions of the trainer to keep from sinking. The better he can swim the more independent he can become. After learning independent movement he will accept only the directions of a trainer who can give him a still higher level of learning and stimulate him to new achievements. The relationship of political enlightenment, political action and social reality could be built on a similar dialectic.

There was a time in Hungary in the 1950's when it appeared enough to refer to the power of the working class and the interests of the people as a whole to direct the attention and actions of people to great, general goals. During such times they did not demand from the leadership a manifold development and application of the society's political culture. Actually, only one element of the political culture operated: enlightenment. Its goal was to see that people understood as quickly as possible the efforts of the leadership. These efforts, they asserted, were identical with the public good. If they succeed in making everyone understand this, most people will choose the good. The enemy, they said, could confuse peoples' minds but one can successfully fight this with basic enlightenment and theoretical education.

The ideal at that time was dedication to the smallest detail, without exception and complete unity. To doubt this amounted to betrayal. This can be explained by the circumstance that we faced an exceptionally tenacious and determined foe, and even the slightest wavering could have been fatal. In the final analysis, however, it was precisely this outlook and practice which made it difficult to come to terms with the enemy, for below the apparent unity which was created with words of power deep underlying processes remained, and whose volatile and strained contradictions could no longer be controlled by political means. This situation played into the hands of those who made the consequences of the political system based on this appear as a system which was incapable of bringing the efforts of the community and of individuals into harmony with a goal of higher order.

In this period, namely in the first half of the 1950's, political habits and feelings became a part of the political culture. Certain positive elements also survive, like loyalty to principles, deep commitment, sensitivity toward the interests of the working classes, and a sense of responsibility for the power of the working class. Since then, chiefly as a consequence of the victory over the counter-revolution and a proper policy, identification with socialism and agreement with the most important political goals have become general in the society. It has become a habit in our political culture that more and more [people] judge various attitudes on the basis of socialist values and norms. But the opposite of this also lives on and has an effect, for in some people the quality of loyalty is to cling to dogma and to fear change, while the interest of working classes becomes an empty slogan. It was in the 1950's that intolerance grew strong toward the use of different kinds of approaches, a phenomenon which is also known to have existed earlier in our history and is still alive. In many people the inclination toward voluntarism is still alive, or an excessive attraction to forceful methods even where intellectual and political weapons are more effective.

A no less negative feature of our political culture is the still frequently encountered concept that regards politics and public affairs in general as the work of the specially appointed social group, and from which it is best to stay as far away as possible. Behind this political apathy--in addition to historical causes, false knowledge and orientation difficulties--are institutions which operate mostly in a formal way and regard the citizen or the worker only as a means. Historical experience shows that people who are politically indifferent for some reason are motivated under difficult conditions, and if their activity does not encounter an appropriately attractive program that is understandable in everyday language and [whose] ideals that give faith, then they give events a negative connotation. Since the nonsubstantive institutions in their environment cannot teach them responsible civic behavior, and in fact steers them away from it, our ideas could not find their way to them, and therefore in certain situations it is a vain hope to expect responsible behavior from those who think this way. The party regards it as one of its most important tasks to eliminate the causes of political indifference with the development of socialist democracy.

To this day we have been unable to weed out the above-mentioned phenomena from our political culture, and in fact we have not been able to completely eliminate all the causes. But our whole policy is directed at making the socialist national unity, through constant renewal, remain always a real unity which it will govern the country with the understanding and cooperation of the majority.

According to the policy conducted by the party for more than two decades, the important thing is not that it should carry out properly for the people the tasks conceived in their interest but that the people should be such participants in leadership who not least of all through this participation recognize their real needs and interests and in this way also recognize the needs of their own actual situation. That is, a substantive democratization process in state life and at the workplace can only be actually developed and a responsible citizen who shares in problems can be created only if people are not regarded merely as objects for guidance to always be enlightened, educated and programmed, but if they are also

seen as subjective persons who can be educated and enlightened through responsible participation, who can arrive at the truth of our ideas by practical action, which is the most obvious way for the masses and at the same time these ideas are made more productive.

The ruling class and the leaders have an enormous responsibility in creating the political culture of a society. Indeed, without an appropriate political culture, particularly if the contradictions are becoming sharper and the pressure of the external enemy is one the rise, there will be a wide scope for demagoguery. This is also the case with socialism. Demagoguery likes the passions and makes it more difficult to arrive at sober perceptions, and it creates realization possibilities for those who cleverly conceal their real goals and gain an interest in the public good which is actually something very specific or related to a personal stance. If somewhere or in some question demagoguery gains ground, this is a sure sign of the backwardness of the political culture and the spread of irresponsibility. The most competent who are excluded from political participation are [left to discharge] a demagogic [role]. They are not given responsibility but boringly repetitive, abstract cases of what socialist should be like. Because of their situation as outsiders they are always calling these ideas to account vis-a-vis reality and those who, in their opinion, are responsible for this reality.

Basic social interests are linked to our political culture. Our political culture must be built on the party's policy. The party realizes the power of the working class in leading society and in such a way that by applying the theory of scientific Marxism-Leninism it transforms the partial interests that grow into conflicts arising at various places into a driving force and links it into the realization of social interest. That is, it does not tell people what their needs and interests should be under the sign of some abstract ideal, but it seeks to recognize and satisfy the needs of people, and with this knowledge formulate the goals into ends that can be pursued.

With such political experiences and theoretical methods of approach, we must speak of those tasks which face us in the development of political culture and the ideological struggle.

The Importance of Reformist Initiative

Lenin declared that after victory the socialist revolution takes on reform. A socialist society can avoid the shocks that accompany development if it rationally uses the power it acquired in the revolution and extends its capabilities to continuous reform. Where this capability is lost or is not developed, political crises and shocks are inevitable. Reform is a consciously chosen form of political mobilization, and in this sense it is a part of the political culture of those in power. Therefore, an indispensable condition of successful reform is that it should be built on an appropriate mass base and receive adequate publicity. It should be clear in its principles and should not boost efforts alien to socialism. Of course, every new initiative calls to life or awakens ambitions which do not serve the realization of socially useful goals. Every initiative must be planned with this risk taken into account and the necessary correction mechanisms built in.

The development of a capability for reform has the advantage of preserving the dynamism and initiative of our system and avoids having outside forces offer false alternatives in lieu of a ripe change. For example, the interests in socialism also call to life in a necessary way certain interest representational needs. In order to express these in socialism, with the party's direction and its integrating role, appropriate institutions must be further developed on the soil of the system and by way of reforms.

One of the keys to the success of our policy is the fact that after the victory we won over the counter-revolution, the party advanced our entire revolution with reforms in the Leninist sense by consistently realizing its main policy direction. By protecting and strengthening the bases of the system, it did not allow elements of stagnation to be built into these bases. It chose the undoubtedly more difficult method of realizing and guiding social unity and a general line of direction that is progressive, innovative and initiative taking. This method of guidance, the reformist initiative, turned out to be truly successful and truly revolutionary. It can be ascribed to this fact that the number of people who are politically indifferent has declined, that there has been no room for demagoguery and those who offer a middle class democratic alternative to social democracy have not acquired any considerable base. All our people could rest assured that a successful policy was being realized under the sign of which the best forces of the nation could join ranks and build together. The efforts on behalf of the nation also serve the progress of mankind. In the future as well, this guarantee can only be given by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

The Capability for Change

Because economic conditions are becoming more and more difficult, we are again facing new tasks in a new situation. At the 12th Party Congress the communist and the whole nation again had an opportunity to think through and become familiar with this situation and take on the task of changing and improving it. For reasons beyond our power, the possibilities for the dynamism of the economy have declined. At times like this it is even more justified for us to open in other areas--intellectual life and politics--a new path for mobilization and initiatives that also help the economy. It is only in this way that we can mobilize our major reserve, the capabilities latent in people and the knowledge of society. Here new generations keep appearing for public life and community tasks. These generations cannot be put on the list of losses. And any way, what is a loss to us is a gain to others. If we continue progressing on the road of socialist democracy, this alternative cannot even rise. It is only with this policy that we can achieve having a general political culture in which despite the growing requirements on work and the slower improvement in material welfare the citizens will know and follow higher values.

Based on great results and successes, our party's policy has created the possibility that its general line of direction should continue in the interest of the entire country and should not be exposed to the fluctuations of economic situations. The party has a good history and good bases to prevent daily tactical considerations from crushing its strategy. That it should be so, at the same

time maintaining the general line of direction, it must carry in itself the capability of changes and making changes. Only in this way can we make sure that we will not have to do merely those things which are forced on us but those which in our conviction, in agreement with the whole nation and hold to be in the interest of the whole nation.

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HUNGARY PERMITS PUBLICATION OF BIOGRAPHY FAVORABLE TO IMRE NAGY

Bonn DER SPIEGEL in German 26 Jan 81 pp 130-132

/Text/ A book now published in Hungary offers the first rehabilitation of former Premier Imre Nagy, executed as a "counterrevolutionary" after the 1956 popular rising. The book was written by a former comrade.

Zoltan Vas, born 1903 in Budapest, correctly identifies himself on the cover of his recently published autobiography: "I am a retired minister and writer. I am giving an account of more than 35 years of my eventful communist life."

This account--running to 757 pages and entitled "Viszontagsagos Eletem" /My Eventful Life/--is the current political sensation in Hungary. That is because old communist Vas has tackled no less than the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy--that CP politician who, in the course of the revolutionary days of autumn 1956, announced Hungary's secession from the Warsaw Pact and asked the United Nations for help against the invading Soviet forces.

For the first time ever an officially sanctioned book describes the Hungarian popular rising against CP rule as a "tragic event" instead of an evil "counterrevolution." For the first time Premier Nagy, later executed, is depicted as an upright Hungarian and communist, not as a "traitor." The author says verbatim: "I loved and respected Imre Nagy."

The fact that the Vas autobiography was allowed to be published by the noted Budapest Magveto Publishing House demonstrates the resolution of the Hungarian regime finally to tackle its past--despite events in Poland. Obviously some national relaxation is to be brought about before the 25th anniversary of the Hungarian October Revolution in October 1981.

The attempt is certainly needed. In the past quarter century there was not even the slightest effort ideologically to digest the most dramatic chapter in Hungarian CP history.

Up to now party chroniclers took it easy. They used the "traitor" Nagy more or less as a symbol of guilt and placed him in the "pillory of history" (Vas). As they described it, Nagy initially provided the intellectual preparation for the "counterrevolution" and later, at the crucial moment, allowed it to rampage to such an extent that Hungarian communism could be saved only by Soviet tanks.

The usual version runs that Imre Nagy was a hopeless sectarian all his life, holding "right deviationist views on the nature of the popular democracies" ("Manual of the Hungarian Workers Movement").

That is claimed to have been the reason why he was unable to hold on to any of his many jobs. Already in 1949 Nagy was expelled--for good reasons--from the Politburo, because he opposed the collectivization of agriculture. Subsequently he "conducted merely formal autocriticism" but, immediately after his 1953 appointment as prime minister, "more and more openly pursued revisionist policies."

When, thereupon, he lost his office and party membership, he became "one of the leaders of the ideological-political preparation of the counterrevolution" evidenced by his reelection to the premiership in the days of the popular uprising in October and November 1956.

In Zoltan Vas a witness has at last come forward, who professes himself a "good friend" and "close collaborator" of the outlaw.

Vas is a communist of the very oldest standing. For 15 years from 1925 on he was jailed by right wing dictator Horthy and not released until 1940, when the Soviet Union exchanged him for flags captured from the 1848 Hungarian revolutionary army.*

After 1945 returnee Vas rose to senior positions. First he was mayor of Budapest, subsequently president of the Planning Office, and finally director of the Komlo coal mines.

In the fall of 1956 Vas was a member of Imre Nagy's government and nearly shared his fate. At the end of the popular uprising, like Nagy, he was deported to Romania where he also was threatened with the death sentence.

Charges against him were dropped only thanks to the personal intervention of Istvan Dobi, then head of state. From that time on Vas had enough of politics and retired.

Now Zoltan Vas' memoir offers a radical correction of the Nagy image hawked around hitherto. He describes the skilled fitter Imre Nagy not as a sectarian but as a lifelong devoted communist--admittedly unorthodox and thoughtful, but always mindful of the good of the party.

Vas is almost lyrical in his praise of the achievements recorded by the first Nagy administration of 1953: "Internal party democracy was to some extent restored, as was democracy at government level. Tackled at the same time was the abolition of lawlessness. The government issued a sweeping amnesty. Internment camps were closed. The population breathed again."

Vas is positive: Imre Nagy was not in the least responsible for the outbreak of the revolt. On the contrary, he took the only correct steps to avoid the disaster--raising the standard of living, cutting government debts, lowering the work norms, giving up the forcible collectivization of farming.

* Hungarian flags which had been captured in 1849 by the Russian forces aiding Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph to put down the Hungarian revolution and since then kept in Moscow

Vas is equally frank in pointing at those who, in his opinion, were really responsible for the bloodbath of the popular rising: The old Stalinists Rakosi, Gero and Farkas, in other words the Nagy opponents in the party. "They are the ones whom popular sentiment places in the pillory of history."

Author Vas thinks he knows exactly why Imre Nagy was unable to hold on to any of his leading positions, despite his popularity and sensible ideas: Nagy foundered on the personal hatred of comrades Gero and company: "He remained humane within the party leadership and politically depended on himself alone."

Vas actually furnishes credible evidence of the root cause of this hostility. He ascribes the Gero peoples "deeply offended feelings" to an episode in 1945, which he himself witnessed:

Toward the end of the war Zoltan Vas was waiting in already liberated Arad and received his party friends Gero, Farkas, Nagy and Revai who were arriving from Moscow.

His main concern was a large sum of money, looted by some communists from the Bekecsaba Bank and handed over to him. What to do with it? Soviet occupied Arad was still under attack from German bombers.

After much discussion Vas and his comrades agreed to divide the large sum into five equal parts. Vas and his lot stayed in Arad. The returned Moscow emigres Gero, Farkas, Nagy and Revai set off in the direction of Budapest. However, they did not get very far.

According to Vas "a Soviet patrol stoped the four civilians who spoke Russian with a Hungarian accent. 'Spies,' thought the Soviets. They believed to be dealing with Nazi agents who had been infiltrated by the Germans under cover of the air raid alarm."

The situation became critical when the Red Army men found identical and large packages of money on all suspects. There was a good deal of yelling, uproar, questions upon questions. And suddenly Imre Nagy had gone--stolen away.

The Soviets were so furious that they were about to shoot the trio Gero-Revai-Farkas. It needed the intervention of Soviet officers and, finally, Marshal Malinowski, to save the top Hungarian agents from execution by the Red Army.

"After a sleepless night the three men got back to my Arad apartment, all in a foul mood," Vas remembers. Much later Imre Nagy also returned, rested and freshly shaved.

"Gero and the others attacked him: How could he have run away in such a situation. They had almost been shot because of him."

"Imre Nagy, cool as ever, defended his decision: 'Would it have been any wiser possibly to have four comrades killed?'"

'OSTEUROPA' REVIEWS STRIKE SITUATION

Stuttgart OSTEUROPA in German No 12, 1980 pp 1261-1284

[Article by Dr Karl Hartmann, head of the Polish Department of Deutschlandfunk [Radio Germany], Cologne: "Strikes in Poland"]

[Text] In the first 10 days of July of this year, when in various cities of Poland there occurred token strikes and shorter work stoppages on account of indirect meat price increases--effective from 1 July--hardly anyone thought that this would give rise to a test of strength between the striking mass of workers and the state--a test of strength that would lead to the verge of a catastrophe. This was anticipated neither by the disappointed, embittered and thus striking workers nor by the Party and its first secretary, Edward Gierek, who subsequent to the customary Crimian talks with the Soviet party boss Brezhnev was vacationing on the Black Sea.

However, there had been many indications that things in Poland were in a bad way. In the last few years, the economic difficulties had given rise to growing embitterment on the part of broad segments of the population. The increasing scarcity of essential commodities, the deteriorating situation in regard to the supply of basic foodstuffs, above all meat and meat products, accompanied by more or less disguised price hikes, and the by now chronic housing shortage--all these factors had created an increasingly irritable mood. In addition, there was great hopelessness. No one believed that the Party and the State leadership would be able to overcome the difficulties. On the contrary. In view of the state's financial situation, which bordered on bankruptcy, there was good reason to fear that things would get worse. All this was accompanied by the stagnation and increasing decline of the regimented intellectual and cultural life. Even before 1 July, the key-date in regard to the momentous meat price increases, the situation in Poland was characterized by a serious crisis of confidence between the population and the Party and State leadership.

There was no lack of warning voices and of unequivocal criticism regarding the situation in state and society--and this goes not only for the last 2 years. The dissatisfaction with the overall situation was universal. A protest movement--which usually is referred to as the democratic opposition and which is differentiated and politically diversified, from the "Flying Universities" to the "Free Trade Unions" and the "Polish Independent Pact" (PPN)--soon extended to many realms of life. This movement was and is agreed that the conditions in Poland must be changed, that the Polish people need freedom, truth and bread--as the slogans circulated often put it--i.e. economic conditions worthy of human beings. And the

movement is agreed that the Soviet-Russian influence on Polish affairs must be checked and curtailed. A distinguishing characteristic of a significant part of this movement is the close contact with the working masses, which has been sought deliberately. The Catholic Church has always been well disposed toward this protest movement (see OSTEUROPA, No 3, 1980 pp 252-255).

There were memorandums and detailed proposals by individual and entire groups of intellectuals and politicians, who harshly took to task the Party and State leadership and who unsparingly exposed its mistakes and failures. The response--if there was a response--consisted for the most part of cosmetic measures such as the replacement of Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz at the Party Congress of February 1980 or of less effective organizational changes, but above all of attempts to master the increasingly serious economic crisis by means of new foreign loans, which made Poland the Eastern Bloc's most heavily indebted state vis-a-vis the West.

The results of a poll--submitted to the Central Committee in 1979--of 141 prominent figures of Poland's intellectual, political and economic life--scholars, writers, artists, politicians and economic experts, including prominent members of the Party and representatives of the Catholic Church--represented a memorandum of the aforementioned type. This memorandum summarized the views of these individuals in regard to the situation of Polish society and of the Polish state. The poll was organized by the discussion group "Experience and Future" (DfP), which had been established in November 1978 and which soon comprised over 100--in part prominent--representatives of the intellectual, cultural, economic and political sectors. The first poll of this group among its own ranks, which was concerned with the most important problems of the Polish people and of the Polish state, resulted in a paper entitled "Report on the State of the Republic and Ways of Its Restoration"; this paper was likewise submitted to the highest political and state organs.

The second poll covered a larger group of people. Their statements were summarized in a 75-page paper entitled "How Can We Extricate Ourselves?" This paper was published--in mimeographed form--in May 1980 (excerpts in DIE ZEIT, No 35, 22 Aug 80); it contained much useful and noteworthy criticism, proposals, admonitions and suggestions, without calling into question the leading role of the Party or the basic principles of the socialist state. Presumably, the operation was meant to bring about some kind of cleansing thunderstorm within the Party and State leadership in order to make possible a turn for the better. The participants of this and of the preceding poll were agreed that the crisis in Poland was for the most part of a social and political nature and that the success of the economic reforms thus depended primarily on changes in the exercise of power and in the policy pursued by the Party organs and the state. All of those polled demanded the full truth concerning the situation of state and society. The effect desired did not come about; the Party and State leaders obviously were not aware of the seriousness of the situation.

Strikes Proliferating

The initially sporadic work stoppages that took place in various enterprises and that aimed to secure wage increases as compensation for the meat price increases rapidly proliferated in the second half of July. These strikes were peaceful, and subsequent to negotiations with the local enterprise managements they usually resulted rather quickly in wage increases. A turning point in this development

were the strikes that broke out in mid-July in a number of Lublin enterprises. These strikes were joined by railroad workers and by employees of the local transportation enterprises, bread factories, slaughterhouses and some other enterprises; consequently, the city was largely paralyzed. For the first time, the Politburo appealed to the strikers, urging them to end the walkout as soon as possible. This appeal, which was circulated only in the local press organs and radio programs, contained the first threat--a reference to the Soviet Union: The strikes might have an alarming effect on the friends of Poland. At the same time, the Politburo promised to establish a commission for examining the demands of the strikers. The appeal did not meet with great response (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 21 Jul 80). In the main, the strike was continued on the same scale until the strikers were promised--after about a week--sizeable wage increases. But this did not put an end to the strike wave. On 21 July, newspaper truck drivers went on strike in Warsaw; on 23 July, short-term strikes reportedly took place in Wroclaw, Ostrow, Wielkopolski, Starowa Wola, Lubartow and Chelm, and on the following days, in Kielce, in the ports of Gdynia and Gdansk and in Poznan and Ursus (near Warsaw).

In various cities, e.g. Wroclaw and Poznan, special commissions were established that tried--by increasing the worker canteens' meat supply and by engaging in discussions with dissatisfied workers--to improve the general mood, but these measures were of no avail. In the first week of August, strikes broke out again in Warsaw. The garbage disposal workers demanded wage increases and additional allowances for work injurious to health. On 12 August, the Warsaw bus and street-car drivers walked out for a day. In both cases, the strikers resumed their work after having been granted wage increases. At the same time, however, strikes broke out in other cities.

This first phase of the strike wave was distinguished by the following characteristics: The strikes were generally short-lived and initially most of them were token strikes. The demands of the strikers were almost exclusively concerned with economic issues and the conflicts were settled on the basis of arrangements with the local enterprise managements. In effecting these arrangements, both sides deliberately by-passed the trade unions, which were not trusted. The Polish mass media avoided using the term "strike." Only in Lublin did the Politburo step in and it was only during the last walkouts in Warsaw that the Party officially admitted that there were strikes in the country. This acknowledgement was made vis-a-vis foreign journalists by Jerzy Lukaszewicz, the PZPR Central Committee's secretary in charge of propaganda; he assured the journalists that the strikes were triggered by purely economic factors and that they would not lead to major political changes. He also spoke of preparations for a congress of the State Trade Union Association and of plans to extend the powers of the workers' autonomous organs that had been established in 1957 and that had soon thereafter become ineffectual (SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 14 Aug 80).

The Strikes on the Coast

A marked turning point in the strike wave was the beginning of the Gdansk shipyard workers' walkout on 14 August. It was triggered by the dismissal of Anna Walentinowicz, a committed champion of the free trade unions. The strike in the Lenin Shipyard, the shipyard in which the--subsequently bloodily crushed--strike of 1970 had started, was joined by 17,000 workers. They demanded the reemployment of Anna Walentinowicz, and in addition, wage increases and independent trade unions.

It was the first time that a decidedly political demand was raised so unequivocally; the strikes in Poland assumed a new quality--a quality much more dangerous to the strikers and their employer, the state. Wage increases alone were rejected by the striking workers, and subsequently the workers increased their political and socio-economic demands. Subsequently, the situation at the strike front grew more and more critical. For the first time, TRYBUNA LUDU, the official party organ, indirectly urged the strikers to resume their work (15 Aug 80). The company management was prepared to meet some of the political demands, but it was not in a position to permit the establishment of new, independent trade unions.

At this stage, the Party appears to have recognized the gravity of the situation. On 15 August, Edward Gierek returned from his vacation on the Crimea--apparently earlier than planned, but much too late in view of the events in the country. In a television address delivered in the evening of that day, Premier Babiuch conceded that Poland was confronted with serious economic difficulties; he also admitted that the government had not always acted correctly, that the population had not been adequately informed of the dangerous state of the Polish economy; he stated that "work stoppages" had occurred in a number of enterprises and he urged the strikers to resume their work. But he also used this opportunity to speak of enemies of the People's Republic of Poland--enemies who, he claimed, were exploiting the tense atmosphere for their own political purposes and who raised demands that were totally unrelated to the aspirations of the working class and harmful to the interests of the nation (TRYBUNA LUDU, 16/17 Aug 80). The premier's speech produced no effect.

Meanwhile, the strike wave was spreading along the Baltic Sea coast, extending beyond shipyards and port facilities. The blocking of telephone and other contacts with Gdansk was of no avail. Attempts by the Gdansk Party leadership to intimidate the strikers produced no effect. Even the temporary concentration near Gdansk of militia units from other parts of Poland failed to produce results. Thus the strike in the tri-city, Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot, and in various coastal towns to the east and west of it gradually assumed the character of a local general strike.

Walkouts were reported from other Polish cities as well. The Party now felt it had no choice but to engage in serious negotiations with the strikers. It dispatched to Gdansk the deputy premier, Tadeusz Pyka, and to Szczeczn, his co-deputy, Kazimierz Barcikowski. In these two strike centers, there were formed umbrella strike committees that were to conduct negotiations on behalf of all strikers on the coast. The striking workers showed a surprisingly high degree of discipline; they did not leave the plants struck and by themselves maintained order. Their demands, including the political demands, were presented in such a way that they could not be considered a threat to the existing social and government system. Even some Party members participated in the strikes. Here, too, the state trade unions were never asked to participate in the negotiations. They were not recognized as representatives of the workers' interests. The government delegations made persistent attempts to engage individual enterprises in discussions and to pass by the umbrella strike committees. This transparent maneuver proved unsuccessful.

Gierek Appeals

No agreement was reached. The situation grew more and more serious. On 18 August, Party boss Gierek abruptly canceled his planned Hamburg visit with Federal Chancellor Schmidt and on the same day he delivered a television address to the Polish population. At that time, in the Gdansk area alone well over 50,000 workers were on strike in approximately 260 enterprises. Gierek insistently appealed to the strikers, urging them to go back to work. The word that Babiuch had not yet dared to say was now articulated by Gierek: the strikes, which he said would not improve the situation in the country. Without mincing matters, he spoke of blunders the government had committed in its economic policy and he stated that the impending Central Committee session would introduce changes and initiate personnel shakeups. He promised gradual wage increases for all occupational categories, a price freeze for meat and meat products until the fall of 1981, additional meat imports to improve the supply situation as compared to 1979, strict price controls for basic foodstuffs, extension of the foodstuff assortment, increased child allowances from 1981 on, and greater autonomy for trade and industry. He appealed above all to the shipyard and port workers of the Gdansk area; to Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot and the entire voivodship, he announced implementation of a new developmental program already adopted by the Politburo and promised to meet most of their demands.

Echoing Babiuch, Gierek spoke of attempts to exploit the strikes for political purposes. For the first time, reference was made in this connection to irresponsible individuals and anarchistic and antisocialist groups. Here, too, the warning was coupled with a threat. Gierek stated that activities threatening the foundations of Poland's political and social order would not be tolerated and that only a socialist Poland could be a free, independent state within secure borders. The reference to the borders is especially striking. In crisis situations of the past few years, it had been customary to point to the dangerous revisionism in the FRG, which called into question Poland's western border. In view of the changes in the relations with the FRG, in view of the loans granted, especially the--already agreed-upon--new German DM 1.2 billion loan, such a hackneyed bugbear would be inappropriate, particularly on the part of Gierek. Or could Gierek possibly have meant the threat to Poland's borders from another side? This is nonetheless unlikely. And there is another significant aspect. As has always been the case, when the Party and the State have been in trouble--1970/71 being the most recent instance--Gierek now called on the Church and the Catholics for support. He praised the steady improvement of the relations between the State and the Church and in his appeal, he addressed himself to the Polish people and to the Catholics in particular (TRYBUNA LUDU, 19 Aug 80).

Gierek's speech did not meet with any response on the part of the strikers. The strikes spread. There were walkouts in other cities on the Baltic Sea. In Nowa Huta, too, the workers went on strike. Gierek was trusted no more than Babiuch. In 1970 and 1976, Gierek and the Party had promised the workers a great many things, but they had kept hardly any of these promises. The trustful relationship between the workers and the Party was seriously damaged. If it did not want to resort to force or to risk intervention from outside, the Party had no alternative but to engage in negotiations, i.e. to negotiate--in keeping with the demands of the striking workers on the coast--with the umbrella strike committees.

The Negotiations on the Coast

At first, the negotiations with the Gdansk Strike Committee made no headway; the demands of the workers were known, but the government's representative, Deputy Premier Pyka, was not empowered to give his assent. Even the very first version of the Gdansk demands contained certain political points that the Party was not prepared to accept. Free trade unions, the right to strike, and abolition of censorship—these were the demands that were bound to be divisive. These demands were part of the initial 16 points of the Gdansk Umbrella Strike Committee; they were also among the 21 points of the Committee's bargaining offer and among the 28 points of the Szczeczn Strike Committee. Up till the last moment, the negotiations between the strikers and the government commissions revolved around these three key demands, which characteristically headed the list of demands. All of the parties involved realized that fulfillment of these demands would be equivalent to a weakening of the basic foundations of Poland's social and government system. Both in Gdansk and in Szczeczn, additional political demands were raised that greatly troubled the Party. In both cities, the workers demanded that the churches be given access to the mass media. They also demanded the release of all political prisoners and abolition of the privileges enjoyed by the militia, the security service and the party apparatus.

In regard to its demand for free trade unions, the Gdansk Strike Committee relied on Convention 87 of the International Labor Organization, which was ratified by the People's Republic of Poland and which is concerned with free trade unions, and in regard to the demand for abolition of censorship, it relied on the liberty of opinion and the right to publish that are guaranteed by the constitution of the People's Republic of Poland. It was in this connection that the workers demanded that all religious creeds be granted access to the mass media. Among the demands of the Szczeczn Strike Committee, which on the whole did not show as strong a political orientation, the most prominent item was Point 8, which requested that the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference and the UN Human Rights Charter be made public in Poland. This can certainly be considered a telling request.

As compared with the aforementioned disputes, agreement was reached relatively quickly in regard to the strike committees' economic demands, which in the main were concerned with wage increases, continued payment of wages for strikers, cost-of-living increases, adequate food supplies and increased social security benefits. On the coast and in the strike negotiations elsewhere, the state was quite willing to consider such wishes or to promise their fulfillment at a later date, in order to prevent a further spread of the extremely costly strikes. However, in view of the state's limited capacities, one can safely assume that the government representatives were aware of the fact that these agreements and promises were quite flippant. On 21 August, Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Jagielski took the place of his colleague Pyka as head of the government commission in Gdansk. The leadership in Warsaw did not approve of the way Pyka had conducted the negotiations, and the strikers, too, had found fault with him on various issues.

Subsequently, the negotiations in Gdansk and Szczeczn were subject to increasing pressure. The strikes were still spreading and walkouts were reported from various parts of Poland. There was the threat of a general strike with all its consequences—economic and much more serious ones: There was the threat of a forcible solution, including the possibility of outside intervention. For in Moscow, East

Berlin, Prague and other East European centers, the developments in Poland were being observed with extreme concern. These observers realized very soon that the Polish workers' movement could infect their own countries. The movement's thrust seemed highly suspicious. The demands of the Polish strikers could become the demands of their own working masses. Disregarding the acute economic crisis in Poland, the conditions in these countries were the same. After some time, disquieting comments were heard from the neighboring socialist states. But in Poland, too, statements were made that blamed "antisocialist forces" for the situation on the Baltic Sea coast (TRYBUNA LUDU, 22 Aug 80).

The situation grew increasingly grave. Something had to be done so as to forestall the Warsaw leaders favoring a hard-line course and thus to facilitate an agreement with the strikers that would accommodate their political demands as well. Three times, Jagielski--together with a government commission--came to the Gdansk Lenin Shipyard to negotiate with the yard's strike committee. The committee was headed by Lech Walesa, an energetic, incorruptible strike leader who was very popular with the workers and who as early as 1970 had gone on strike with the Gdansk shipyard and port workers and thus had gained valuable experience. In the elaboration of the demands and in the talks with the government representatives, Walesa was assisted by experts recruited from the ranks of scientists and intellectuals. At the request of the government delegation, the Gdansk Strike Committee signed a statement in which it recognized the Party's leading role in the state. Only one member refused to sign and thereupon left the committee. The strikers thereby documented that they did not aim through their demands to destroy the socialist system in Poland. The representatives of the government needed this declaration to be able to accept the political demands of the strikers and to defend the results externally as well as internally.

In the end, after agreement had been reached on other points thanks to various compromise proposals, including those by the Umbrella Strike Committee, the negotiations focused on the right to establish independent trade unions. Up to the last moment, the government commission refused to accept these demands and instead spoke of a radical reform of the Central Trade Union Council and strike (sic!). Showing remarkable firmness and discipline, the strikers maintained their standpoint. They received support from all sides. Solidarity strikes spread rapidly, extending to the industrial area of Upper Silesia. The West, too, showed its admiration and offered moral support; even though it tried to avoid doing anything that could be interpreted as direct interference, the West clearly expressed its sympathy. Support was given above all by the trade unions, some of which were also prepared to lend material assistance. The "Free Trade Union of the Soviet Union" (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 30 Aug 80) and groups of dissidents in other East European states likewise showed solidarity. From Gor'kiy, his place of banishment, Sakharov paid tribute to the strikers. Most importantly, the strikers were backed by the overwhelming majority of the Polish population. The strike leaders showed a sense of responsibility. During the last stage of the negotiations, Walesa advocated--reportedly at the emphatic request of the Polish Government--solidarity demonstrations, but he opposed further strikes, in order to spare the country unnecessary losses. He said additional enterprises should be struck only if the talks with the government broke down or if satisfactory results could not soon be attained (DIE WELT, 29 Aug 80).

The Settlement

Final agreement was reached on 30 August in Szczecznyn and on 31 August in Gdansk. In the morning, the strike committees in Gdansk and in Szczecznyn--where the difficulties were not as serious as those in Gdansk--and the government commissions negotiating with them signed agreements, the provisions of which included the establishment of independent trade unions. In Gdansk, the parties discussed the last details as late as 31 August, even though the Central Committee had convened on 30 August--probably in the late evening--and had approved the results of the negotiations of Gdansk and Szczecznyn--as presented by Jagielski and Barcikowski (see TRYBUNA LUDU, 1 Sep 80). In the evening of that day, the agreement was approved by the PZPR Central Committee.

For the time being, the test of strength between the strikers and the Party had ended in a victory of the former. Before the agreement was signed, telephone service was restored in the Gdansk area and most importantly, a group of civil rights champions of the Committee for Social Self-Defense--headed by Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik--which had been arrested the day before, was released. The government called the agreement a victory of *raison d'état*.

The agreements negotiated in Gdansk and Szczecznyn differ in accordance with the original differences in the demands of the two strike committees, on which they are based. In keeping with the demands of the strike committees, the agreements were published (see TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, 7 Sep 80). On account of the fact that in Gdansk greater emphasis was placed on the political demands and greater efforts were made to enforce their fulfillment, the text of the Gdansk Agreement is much more extensive than the protocol of the Szczecznyn Agreement. In the Gdansk Agreement, just the implementing regulations concerning Points 1 to 3--establishment of independent trade unions, safeguarding of the right to strike and of the protection of strikers and persons supporting them, observance of the constitutionally guaranteed liberty of opinion and right to publish, and admission of the representatives of all religious creeds to the mass media--are as long as the entire Szczecznyn Agreement. In this respect, it is striking that in the Szczecznyn protocol Point 2 of the Gdansk Agreement--the right to strike, etc.--is missing. Whereas the Gdansk Agreement discusses at length ways of radically restricting censorship, the Szczecznyn Agreement merely states that the mode of censorship restriction in Poland is to be specified by 30 November 1980.

The Gdansk Agreement also pays greater attention to the problem of enforcing fulfillment of the economic and social demands. One gains the impression that in the negotiations and in the formulation of the agreement reached the Szczecznyn committee lacked the legal advice that was available to the Gdansk committee. There were also certain concessions. As regards the Gdansk demand for abolition of the financial and material privileges enjoyed by the militia, the security service and the party apparatus, the agreement states pithily: By 31 December 1980, the government will submit proposals concerning standardization of family allowances for all occupational categories. But the agreement also states that the canteens and buffets of the incriminated groups did not differ from those in the enterprises and offices. In the Szczecznyn demands, this point is missing, as is the demand of the Gdansk workers to put an end to the discrimination against church members and individuals not belonging to the Party in regard to appointments to key positions. As is illustrated by the above examples, compromises were made, and to some extent

the strikers had to accept superficial and totally unconvincing statements of the government so as not to jeopardize the whole. And yet, in attaining this agreement, the strikers had won an important battle, even though they had not gained victory. On behalf of the Gdansk Strike Committee, the agreement was signed by its chairman, Lech Walesa, and Mieczyslaw Jagielski signed on behalf of the government commission. In Szczecin, these functions were performed by Marian Jurczyk and Kazimierz Barcikowski, respectively.

On Monday, 1 September, work was resumed in the plants and enterprises on the Baltic Sea coast. But this was not the case in Upper Silesia, Silesia and other parts of Poland, where the strikes--like those in the northeast and southeast--were only now beginning, because the workers in these parts wanted to secure the rights and concessions that had been won on the coast.

The Democratic Opposition and the Strikes

Offhand, it is difficult to ascertain the role played by the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR) and by other groups of the democratic opposition in Poland during the negotiations in Gdansk and Szczecin. It is quite certain that in the strikes on the coast and elsewhere they resolutely and successfully supported the strikers, and what is more, they helped prepare the ground for the well-organized and skillfully led strikes. And there is no doubt that they influenced the course of the negotiations. This is entirely in accord with the *raison d'être* of the Committee for Social Self-Defense, a successor organization of the Committee for the Defense of the Worker (KOR) that had been established in the summer of 1976. At that time, it not only gave financial and moral support to the arrested, maltreated and disadvantaged workers of Radom and Ursus, who in June 1976 had demonstrated against food price increases, but it also forced the state--through its actions that were applauded by all segments of the population--to release from prison all those convicted and to rehabilitate those individuals who had been discriminated against and who had suffered losses. The Committee for Social Self-Defense tried and is still trying firmly to establish itself among the working masses.

In 1978, the "Free Trade Unions" were established and a short time later, there emerged the "Farmers' Committees for Social Self-Help." It goes without saying that these committees were the primary target of the state organs' harsh reprisals. In June 1980, the Committee of Free Trade Unions in Katowice appealed to the president of the United States, Jimmy Carter, for protection from the brutal persecution by the Polish security organs. Among the signatories was Jan Kazimierz Switon, a man well-known in the West who has been arrested many times. In the appeal, the committee assures the president that the "Free Trade Unions" do not engage in any political actions, that they only want to defend the rights of the workers (DZIENNIK ZWIAZKOWY, Chicago, 10 Jun 80). The Committee for Social Self-Defense supported the strikers to the best of its ability. Its members and the "Free Trade Unions" significantly influenced the course of the strike movement. On 11 July 1980, when the strikes were still in the initial stage, the Committee for Social Self-Defense published a statement that comprised the key demands of the strikers on the Baltic Sea coast: independent trade unions, the right to strike, abolition of censorship, immediate release of the political prisoners. In this declaration, the committee urged the Polish population and above all the workers to fight for these rights. At the same time, the committee exhorted the workers not

to be satisfied with revocation of the price hikes or with wage increases, since such measures did not improve the overall situation. The committee called for a radical reform of the Polish economic system. The authors of the declaration emphasized that these were minimum demands that they had been raising for a long time (DZIENNIK ZWIAZKOWY, Chicago, 13 Aug 80).

The members and sympathizers of the Committee for Social Self-Defense lent assistance in other respects as well. They functioned as transmitters of information and as points of contact for the strikers. At all times, they had at their disposal ready and reliable information on the proliferation of strikes in the country and on the events on the coast. And it was they who maintained contact with the Western correspondents in Warsaw and elsewhere and who provided these correspondents with the latest news. For both the strikers and the democratic opposition of all persuasions wanted the world to know what was going on in Poland. They even asked the West to demonstrate its solidarity with the strikers and to protest against arrests and reprisals in Poland--a request identical with that made by the philosopher Leszek Kolakowski in a London press statement on behalf of the Committee for Social Self-Defense (DZIENNIK POLSKI, London, 30 Aug 80). The organizations and individual representatives of the Polish emigre groups in the West did their utmost to insure that this request did not go unheeded. In reply to an interview question as to whether he was a member of the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR), Walesa answered in the negative. At the same time, however, he stated that he had no objections to becoming a member. According to a DPA report of 21 August 1980, at the height of the conflict on the coast the committee appealed to the West, urging it to make it clear to Warsaw and Moscow that the crisis in Poland could be solved only through negotiations, i.e. not through the use of force. Later on, it was reported--but vehemently denied by Moscow--that at the height of the crisis the West had warned the Kremlin, stating that the consequences of an intervention in Poland would be more grievous to the Soviet Union than those of the invasion in Afghanistan. It was not denied, however, that at this time there had been diplomatic contacts between Washington and Moscow in regard to the events in Poland.

Even though the strikes in Poland should be considered a spontaneous manifestation of the workers' dissatisfaction and irritation about the conditions in Poland--which is evidenced by the course of the strike movement--the illegal "Free Trade Unions" nevertheless played a significant part. It is safe to assume that they were active--still at the developmental stage--in quite a few enterprises in various parts of Poland. And it was in such enterprises that they distributed their illegal organ, ROBOTNIK [WORKER]. It was natural for them to come to the fore wherever workers were fighting for their rights. In Gdansk, they were mentioned on several occasions. The fact that the strikers on the Baltic Sea coast succeeded in wresting from the Party--within the Soviet sphere of influence--unparalleled concessions is to some extent attributable to the commitment of the entire democratic opposition in Poland, which in this article is not discussed in detail.

Upheavals in the Party

While in Gdansk and Szczecznyn the negotiations were in progress, radical upheavals took place within the Party. In view of the Party's obvious powerlessness vis-a-vis the spreading workers' strikes that were viewed with ostentatious sympathy by all segments of the population, something had to be done. The crisis of confidence was too grave and too obvious. The working masses distrusted the Party and the

state, because they had been deceived all too frequently. The mistakes and omissions of the Party and state leadership--mistakes that Premier Babiuch and after him, the first secretary of the Party, Gierek, admitted to the Polish population in their television addresses--and the admissions of guilt they thus made before the whole world were bound to lead to consequences.

On 24 August, the fourth plenary session of the PZPR Central Committee and the concomitant session of the State Council initiated radical personnel changes in the party leadership and in the government. Above all, these changes affected key economic positions (see TRYBUNA LUDU, 25 Aug 80). Most importantly, Premier Edward Babiuch--formerly a confidant of Gierek's--had to give up his post. At the same time, he lost his seat in the Politburo. It was only after the last Party Congress in February 1980 that Babiuch had assumed his duties. He had taken the place of Piotr Jaroszewicz--who had headed the government for many years--because Jaroszewicz had not been able to solve the country's economic problems and because the state needed a victim. And now Babiuch--having been in office for no more than 6 months--was toppled for the same reason. The sudden reappearance and rise of Stefan Olszowski, a former foreign minister and Politburo member, was almost as sensational; Olszowski had only recently lost these two positions and he had been relegated to East Berlin, apparently because he had criticized the Party's policy all too openly; moreover, being younger, more forceful and intelligent and a potential successor, he had been viewed with disfavor by Gierek. Remorsefully, the Party reinstated him in the Politburo and appointed him Central Committee secretary.

Aside from Babiuch, the following individuals were forced on 24 August to leave the Politburo: the chairman of the Planning Commission, Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk; the Central Committee secretary and head of the Propaganda and Press Policy Department, Jerzy Lukaszewicz; the trade union chairman and deputy premier, Jan Szydlak, and the acting Politburo members Tadeusz Pyka, who also held the post of deputy premier, and Zdzislaw Zandarowski, likewise deputy premier and Central Committee secretary.

Thus a number of key economic experts were removed from office. Jan Szydlak, the head of the compromised trade unions, was likewise dismissed. Two days later, he was replaced by Romuald Jankowski. It appears that the dismissal of Lukaszewicz was meant as punishment for his information policy, which the workers had sharply criticized for being mendacious.

Gierek thought he had thus demonstrated to the strikers that the Party was dead serious about changing its policy. It was a desperate effort to regain the trust of the working masses. Gierek proceeded ruthlessly, not sparing even his closest advisors or the men of his inner circle from Upper Silesia. Babiuch, Pyka, Szydlak, Wrzaszczyk, his protege Szczepanski, who had been in charge of the radio network and who was charged with scandalous blunders, and Zandarowski, a devoted Gierek follower--all of them were sacrificed, even though it was Gierek himself whom the people expected to take the consequences in view of the country's nearly hopeless economic situation, which had triggered the workers' rebellion against their employer, the Party and the state. For his star had been on the wane for a long time and this became especially evident during those days, when he made futile attempts once again to change the course of events.

Aside from the aforementioned Stefan Olszowski, the Central Committee on this memorable 24 August conferred Politburo membership on the relatively unknown

economist Jozef Pinkowski, who also was appointed premier. The former Central Committee secretary Jerzy Waszczuk, who took the place of Lukaszewicz, and Andrzej Zabinski, a Central Committee secretary who since 1973 had been secretary of the Oppeln Voivodship Committee, were appointed acting Politburo members. In addition to Olszowski, the Party appointed Emil Wojtaszek, an acting Politburo member and former foreign minister, secretary of the Central Committee. Wojtaszek's place in the Foreign Ministry was taken by his former deputy, Jozef Czyrek. Tadeusz Grabski, who in the preceding year had been banished on account of his sharp criticism of Gierek's economic policy, was readmitted to the Central Committee and appointed deputy premier. An important function, the office of head of the Planning Commission, was given to the former finance minister, Henryk Kisiel. Kisiel's place as finance minister was taken by Marian Krzak. Aleksander Kopiec was appointed deputy premier, while Henryk Gawronski took Kopiec's place as minister of the machine building industry. The directorship of the radio network--and thus the succession to Szczepanski--was given to Jozef Berecki, the former editor in chief of TRYBUNA LUDU. Eugeniusz Grochal, chairman of the State Price Commission (PKC), had to hand over this post to Jerzy Gawrysiak, while Stanislaw Kuzinski, president of the Main Statistical Office (GUS), was replaced by Wieslaw Sadowski. All in all, truly a radical upheaval, involving a great many key party and government positions.

Gierek Speaks of a Turning Point

In the televised speech concluding the Central Committee session, Gierek--obviously moved--commented on the changes made. Calling these changes a decisive turning point in the policy pursued by the Party and the State, he said they had been made for the purpose of adjustment to present realities. He stated that it was necessary to eliminate the causes of the general dissatisfaction and to resolve the dramatic conflict by regaining the trust of the working class and of all working people. The Central Committee resolutions were aimed at attaining this objective, said Gierek. The Party leader emphasized that the Party had appointed to responsible positions individuals who had seen--sooner than he himself and the other Party leader--that the party policy had taken a bad turn and who had tried to counteract this development, but whose warnings had not been heeded (and who had therefore been removed from office--a clause Gierek should have added). Here, too, Gierek practiced self-criticism and made promises; however, these promises indicated that the right of codetermination that was to be granted to the workers in regard to economic problems and decisions concerning their affairs did not provide for the establishment of independent trade unions. He spoke of the great losses caused by the striking workers and of the resulting political danger. But here, too, Gierek refrained from using the word "strike"; he called the strikes "work stoppages." And here, too, he repeated the warning that only a socialist Poland could be an independent state with stable borders (TRYBUNA LUDU, 25 Aug 80).

The speeches of the Central Committee members were not published. Tadeusz Fiszbach, the first secretary of the Gdansk PZPR Voivodship Committee, is known to have defended the strikers in the shipyards and ports of the tri-city, Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot, who had been accused of being subject to the influence of antisocialist forces (see TRYBUNA LUDU, 22 Aug 80).

The changes in the Party and State leadership and Gierek's urgent appeal left the striking workers unimpressed. In his speech, Gierek called to mind the atmosphere of mutual trust during the period following the unrest of December 1970, but it was

of no avail; the workers were deaf to his argumentation. Cierek had forfeited their trust for good. The striking coastal shipyard and port workers' response to the spectacular upheavals in the Party was unequivocal. They were not interested in changes in the Party and State leadership; they said they wanted convincing changes in the policy pursued by that leadership.

Warning Voices

Accordingly, there was no detente at the strike front; rather, the situation grew increasingly critical--a fact both sides and the world noted with great concern. The Party leadership, too, realized very soon that the personnel changes were not producing any results. At this moment, two leading Central Committee members, Ryszard Wojna and Mieczyslaw Rakowski, warned that the situation was approaching a critical point. Without actually saying so, they were referring to the threat of a forcible solution from inside or--what was more likely--of outside intervention. Both men considered a national catastrophe to be a distinct possibility. Wojna, a well-known commentator of TRYBUNA LUDU, tried to point out the limit that the demands of the strikers must not exceed. He stated that those demands that did not make allowance for Poland's geopolitical situation and function in East-West power relations and that would call into question the Party's role and position in the country's present sociopolitical system exceeded that limit. The warning was all too clear, for he also spoke of antisocialist forces that had joined the protest of the working class, exploiting the workers' dissatisfaction for purposes alien to socialist Poland. Here a dangerous position was established. Indeed, in equating the continuation and proliferation of the strikes and the strikers' political demands with a poisoning of the country's political atmosphere and public life and with disregard for potential fatal consequences for the state and the people, Wojna appeared to be uttering a threat (TRYBUNA LUDU, 27 Aug 80). Wojna presented this article on television on the day preceding its publication in the Party paper. Wojna's intention was clear. He wanted to impel the strikers to go back to work and to give up certain political demands.

On the same day, Mieczyslaw Rakowski--a well-known expert on German affairs and editor in chief of the weekly POLITYKA--delivered a television address to the strikers and the Polish people. His statements were devoid of intimidation and threats; he did not speak of antisocialist forces or of actions threatening socialist Poland. He appeared to be filled with genuine concern about the possibility that the strikers might through their stubbornness lose more than they had already attained before his appeal or would attain in the near future. As he frankly conceded, he was afraid events might result in a national drama and he urged the strikers to moderate their demands (DPA, 28 Aug 80).

In those days, many people shared the concern of these two party politicians--and this goes not only for Poland. These two politicians appear to have represented two trends within the Party--a group inclining toward a hard line, toward intervention, and a more liberal group. It is characteristic that on the same day, on which Wojna and Rakowski presented their appeals on television, TASS spoke of "antigovernment and antisocialist moods" in Poland and of "antisocialist elements" trying to get Poland off the socialist course. Both publicists tried--with the approval and perhaps even at the request of the Party leadership--to check the strike wave and to get the strikers on the coast to make concessions; apparently, it was feared events might take a fateful turn. On 26 August, Cardinal Wyszynski

spoke in Czemstochowa. His words were generally interpreted as a call for moderation at the strike front. In fact, during these days the situation underwent dramatic aggravation. On 26 August, strikes were reported from Wroclaw, Lodz, Olaszyn, Koszalin, Tarnow, and Lublin. On this day, the second round of talks in Gdanek ended, without any agreement having been reached on crucial political problems.

Reactions From the Eastern Bloc

In this turbulent period, during which the neighboring socialist states voiced--for the first time--criticism and concealed threats and during which the attention of the entire world was focused on Poland, the public heard little or nothing about Gierek, the first secretary of the Polish Communists. An ominous sign was the first attack on the Polish Party leadership that was launched by the SED organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND. At least, it looks as though this is what the paper meant to do in reporting the statements on the strikes in Poland by the secretary general of the American Communists, Gus Hall, which were published in DAILY WORLD. According to the SED organ, a bureaucratic style of government was bound to lead to misunderstandings and a strike in a socialist country was an indication of ideological backwardness and was to be blamed on the leadership of the country (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 30/31 Aug 80). This deliberate broadside--fired with Moscow's consent--was aimed at Edward Gierek.

During this period, the socialist states intensified their criticism and their attacks, whereas in the beginning they had exercised remarkable restraint. On the same day, on which East Berlin launched its indirect attack, Moscow's PRAVDA published a short report on a session of the executive board of the Warsaw "Women's League"; in this report, oblique reference is made to antisocialist forces that are said to try to exploit the justified protests of the workers for their own purposes. The report urged that they and their modes of operation be exposed (PRAVDA, Moscow, 31 Aug 80). This was only the beginning of an intensifying wave of criticism that tried to attribute the proliferating strikes with their political demands to an alleged interference by the West in Polish affairs and in general to blame the West for the developments in Poland.

Moscow's PRAVDA gave the starting signal for these attacks: It published an article by Aleksey Petrov, which described the situation in Poland and which on the following day was reprinted in the East Berlin party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND under the original PRAVDA title "Machinations of the Enemies of Socialist Poland." This article tried to establish a direct link between the "antisocialist forces" in Poland and the West and the reactionary Polish emigre groups. According to the article, these circles aim "to impair the socialist achievements of the Polish people and to get Poland off the course it has been following in accordance with the will of the people..." (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 2 Sep 80). Such signals from Moscow and East Berlin were bound to give rise to misgivings in those who recalled the suppression of the "Prague Spring" of 1968--and at this time there were many who were recalling it. The article also voiced the customary criticism of the Western mass media. That Moscow would be greatly troubled by radio broadcasts giving detailed accounts of the events in Poland is evident from the fact that all Russian-language broadcasts from the West were jammed after 20 August.

The attacks against the Western response to the events in Poland were continued in the 4 September 1980 issue of the East Berlin party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND. This issue contained two articles on this subject--a commentary entitled "Anti-Polish Wolves in Sheep's Clothing" that attacked the alleged interference by Western and above all West German media and politicians and a full-page documentation of the East Berlin "Institute for International Politics and Economics" with the characteristic title "Revanchist Activities and Demands of the FRG vis-a-vis the People's Republic of Poland." The documentation begins with a statement that the great majority of the FRG mass media had greatly interfered in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of Poland. In this documentation, the West's manifestations of sympathy for the strikers in Poland are called impermissible interference.

Another article by Aleksey Petrov, published in PRAVDA on 20 September 1980, marked the culmination of Moscow's campaign during this period. In this article, the United States and the FRG are sharply rebuked for interfering in Polish affairs. In the FRG, it is above all the CDU/CSU and the refugee associations which are trying in various ways to influence events in Poland, states the author. In the article, reference is made again to revisionist aspirations. But the author also accuses other social-democratic circles in Europe of trying to influence the course of events in Poland. The accusations culminate in the allegation that NATO had entrusted a special team with the task of observing the events. This sounded quite alarming. In this manner, the Soviet Union had prepared the invasions for saving the--allegedly threatened--socialism in countries within its sphere of influence.

Gierek Ousted

In the last few days before his dismissal, Gierek withdrew from public life. According to a Warsaw Radio broadcast, on 2 September Gierek discussed the situation in the country with Politburo members, secretaries and department heads of the Central Committee and first secretaries of the Party's voivodship committees. The report on the tasks of the Party under the given circumstances was delivered by Stanislaw Kania, the Politburo member in charge of security matters (TRYBUNA LUDU, 3 Sep 80). Subsequently, the Party boss no longer made any public appearance. According to unconfirmed reports, during the next few days Gierek conferred with a group of Soviet party leaders headed by Politburo member Kirilenko at a place close to the Polish-Russian border. It is quite certain, however, that upon conclusion of the Gdansk negotiations Jagielski went to Moscow to report (TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, 21 Sep 80). Jagielski then announced that the Soviet Union would lend Poland economic assistance (TRYBUNA LUDU, 4 Sep 80).

In the afternoon of 5 September, the Politburo convened in Warsaw, and in the evening, the Central Committee held a special session. On the same day, the Sejm convened, with Gierek's seat remaining vacant. According to a medical bulletin of 6 September, Gierek was hospitalized in the morning of 5 September on account of serious cardiac insufficiency (TRYBUNA LUDU, 6/7 Sep 80). In the early morning hours of 6 September, it was reported that for reasons of serious illness Edward Gierek had been relieved of his duties as first secretary of the PZPR. He also lost his seat in the Politburo. Thus Gierek was totally deprived of his power. He was succeeded by Politburo member Stanislaw Kania. At the same time, Kazimierz Barcikowski and Andrzej Zabinski attained Politburo membership and Tadeusz Grabski, Zdzislaw Kurowski and Jerzy Wojtecki were appointed secretaries of the Central Committee (ibid.).

Gierek's dismissal did not come as a surprise. That it was alleged to have been prompted by his failing health is irrelevant. He had been expected to be superseded even sooner. Thanks to the personnel reshuffle on 24 August, he had once more been able to save himself. But the period of grace granted to him by Moscow and by the opponents in his own camp for lack of a convincing alternative then expired. When the demands of the workers were met with concessions that in the opinion of the leading Communists in Moscow, East Berlin, Prague and elsewhere were irreconcilable with the basic socialist principles of state and society and when subsequently new strikes broke out, these leaders and a great many members of the party apparatus in Poland came to feel that Gierek had failed, that he would not be able any longer to control the situation in the country the way they wanted. Gierek had forfeited his authority among the rank and file as well. For reasons of principle, but also because they feared for their privileges, some members of the party apparatus were dissatisfied with the outcome of the test of strength between the working masses on the coast and the state. It was not difficult to blame Gierek for serious blunders--they were quite obvious. He had made many enemies, not least owing to the personnel changes within the Party leadership, both the most recent and the earlier ones.

The New Party Leader

Stanislaw Kania was not a convincing alternative. In the Politburo, there were more prominent personalities--e.g. Stefan Olszowski. Kania was not very well known in the country. A farmer's son, 53 years old, he had first achieved prominence in Communist youth organizations and then had climbed the Party ladder, without attracting much attention. Since 1968, he had been a member of the Central Committee. It was Gierek who had helped him to join the Party leadership. In 1971, he was appointed Central Committee secretary, and in 1975, member of the Politburo. In the Politburo, he had been in charge of the Armed Forces, public security and church affairs. These are important responsibilities, if the objective was to restore law and order in the country, i.e. to check the wave of liberalization. And this is what Moscow--and at least some members of the Central Committee--wanted to do. During the critical stage of the negotiations on the coast, Kania delivered moderate speeches. Apparently, he was against forcible solutions, as long as there was a chance of reaching an agreement with the workers by peaceful means. At the memorable plenary session of the Central Committee on 24 August, Kania delivered the introductory report on the political situation in the country; undoubtedly, this made him stand out from the circle of Politburo members, but essentially it was in keeping with his political responsibilities. Apparently, the move of 6 September was a compromise solution, but Moscow placed confidence in Kania--and this is what counts.

Upon his appointment, the new first secretary delivered a speech that was presented on television, but not by him. Kania stated the Party's most important task was to regain the trust of the working class that had been lost on account of serious mistakes of the leaders; he said the Party would identify and eliminate the causes of the tension so as to prevent a recurrence of such a dramatic situation. Obviously, Kania felt that in regard to the catastrophe feared by all, the most dangerous moment had passed. He promised to see to it that all agreements concluded with the strikers would be honored. But he also spoke of reorganization of the trade unions and he announced the Party would insure that the new independent trade unions developed in a way befitting socialist organizations. Kania

acknowledged to the striking workers that their protest was not directed against the foundations of socialism, against the allies or against the leading role of the Party, but that it was directed against the errors of their policy. The Party very much wanted to show Moscow that its leadership function had not been impaired by the agreements concluded in Gdansk and Szczecin. However, in comparison with his predecessor, Kania spoke much more sharply and threateningly of antisocialist forces bent on exploiting the situation in Poland for purposes opposed to the interests of the workers. He stated that these forces were being fought and that in the future, too, they would encounter resolute opposition on the part of the Party. As compared to the speeches of Kania's predecessors Babluch and Gierek, the new Party boss spoke at greater length about the critical situation in agriculture, one of the principal causes underlying the disastrous conditions in the food sector. It is striking that on the one hand he promised to promote agricultural enterprises of all types, while on the other hand stating that the Party would support the socialist changes in the agrarian sector. And finally, Kania spent a substantial part of his speech on paying obeisance to Moscow. Gierek had not made any reference to Moscow in his last two speeches.

Even though a great deal of what Kania said in his first speech as head of the Polish Communists must be viewed within the framework of that situation, it was not likely to have a calming effect on the Polish population. Moscow's PRAVDA of 8 September 1980 published large parts of Kania's speech, but it omitted the passages, in which Kania said he was not sure whether the Party needed a "leader" and in which he indicated that he did not consider himself a leader. The Kremlin probably meant to show that it wanted him to be a resolute and energetic party leader. This was unequivocally expressed in Brezhnev's congratulatory message (TRYBUNA LUDU, 8 Sep 80).

The change of party leaders left the striking workers unimpressed. They had no reason to cherish great hopes. Kania was not likely to be a greater reformist than Gierek. His speech had provided no indications to this effect. Rather, the workers had reason to fear just the opposite, for Moscow would not have accepted a reformer in this position. For the time being, however, the workers fared quite well under Kania. In the preceding weeks and also in the last few years, his conduct as head of the security forces had been characterized by remarkable restraint. It is possible, however, that it was Gierek who was responsible for this restraint.

The Church and the Strikes

It took the Catholic Church a long time to take an unequivocal stand on the proliferating strikes, but this was certainly not an indication of lack of commitment. The Church in Poland has never remained silent in such situations, neither in 1970 nor in 1976, when the Polish workers protested against injustice and raised justified demands to which the state responded with force and bloodshed, nor before 1976. The Church has always shown that it feels responsible for the fate of Poland and of the Polish people. For this reason, it has never added fuel to a fire; rather, it has always tried to defuse the conflicts, to avert the worst danger—an escalation of violence or outside intervention—and after the event to help calm the situation to the best of its ability. In regard to the stabilization of the domestic situation after the coastal unrest in 1970 and subsequently, in 1976, Gierek was greatly aided by the Church—just like Gomulka in 1956. But the Church has never hesitated to tell the Warsaw party leaders some unpleasant truths—openly and without mincing

matters--and resolutely to demand more rights and liberties. If in the present conflict the Church exercised restraint for a long time, it was probably because it did not want to produce the impression it wanted to aggravate the situation.

On Sunday, 17 August, Cardinal Wyszynski broke the silence. In a sermon delivered in Albendorf, a place of pilgrimage in Silesia, he stated that the Church could not remain indifferent to the great issues moving the nation and the state or to the concerns of the workers. And he also stated what in the view of the Church should be done to restore calm. Following his customary approach, Wyszynski first admonished the Polish people to work conscientiously and to exercise thrift. This was followed by criticism addressed to the state: The state should raise fewer loans and reduce its exports; instead, it should try better to satisfy the moral, social, religious, cultural and economic needs of the nation. At the same time, the Primate requested of Poland the right freely to express one's opinion by telling the faithful: "In Poland, I always demand liberty of opinion." Thus, in its first public statement, the Church unequivocally sided with the workers. And in order to get its message to all Poles and to the strikers in particular, it was shortly afterwards broadcast by Vatican Radio (DZIENNIK POLSKI, London, 22 Aug 80). A short time later, Cardinal Wyszynski had Bishop Lech Kaczmarek, Ordinary of the Gdansk diocese, inform him on the strike situation on the coast.

The striking workers in the coastal cities and in other parts of Poland were always conscious of the support of the Church. In contrast to the authority of the Party and the State, the Church's authority and moral stature are at all times beyond all doubt. Behind it, there stands in a body the mass of the Polish population--proud of its Church and its Polish Pope. It is certainly no accident that the demands of the strikers in Gdansk and Szczeczyn included the demand for access to the mass media for all religious creeds. For a long time, the Catholic Church has been demanding a Catholic press and access to the radio and television network--and since the Poland visit of Pope John Paul II this demand has become still more insistent. In the dispute between the workers and the state, it was characteristic of the importance and attitude of the Church that divine services including confession were conducted for the strikers on a regular basis, that the gates and barriers of the shipyard and port installations were adorned with pictures of the Pope and of the Holy Virgin and that in the conference room of the Lenin Shipyard there was a cross beside the picture of Lenin. The workers striking here and elsewhere and the members of the strike committees were for the most part devout Catholics. And there was one more thing that during these days linked the workers with their Church: the deliberately national stamp they imprinted on their rebellions against the employer, the socialist state. Wherever the workers were on strike and wherever they were negotiating, national colors and national emblems were shown; the masses sang church hymns, but at crucial moments, they sang the national anthem. On this question, Cardinal Wyszynski always took an unequivocal stand. A short time ago, he had addressed 150,000 faithful in Czestochowa, commemorating the Polish victory over the Red Army on the Vistula River 60 years ago; he had stated that this historic event had made it possible for the Polish people to live in accordance with its national traditions and its own culture. He could hardly have criticized more frankly the conditions in many areas of Polish intellectual and cultural life.

Even before Cardinal Wyszynski commented in Albendorf on the strikes, Pope John Paul II--speaking within the framework of a general audience on St. Peter's Square--indirectly called to mind the serious domestic crisis in Poland by saying

in Polish--along with Polish pilgrims--two prayers for his country and by urging--in Italian--the faithful assembled to pray for Poland. And on 20 August, the Pope dispatched a letter to Cardinal Wyszynski, in which he assured the Church in Poland of his concern about the critical situation of his country. In his letter, the Pope said he was praying to God that the Polish Episcopate would once more be able to help the people in the struggle for their daily bread, for social justice and for the safeguarding of their inalienable human rights to their own lives and their own development. Although publication of this letter was prohibited, it was read out on Sunday in all churches and it was also read--subsequent to the divine service--to the workers of the Gdansk Lenin Shipyard. Those who know Poland know what this meant to the strikers and the Polish people in these difficult hours (TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, 7 Sep 80).

The Sermon in Czestochowa

The anticipated detailed comment of the Catholic Church on the situation in the country was made in the sermon delivered by Cardinal Wyszynski on the occasion of the Celebration of the Holy Virgin of Czestochowa on 26 August. One can safely assume that in Poland Wyszynski's statements were awaited not only by the faithful, but also by the striking workers who expected protection, encouragement and advice from their Church. Undoubtedly, the statements were awaited by the totally unsettled Party and State leadership, which was becoming more and more aware of its powerlessness in the dispute with the strikers and which was hoping the words of the Primate of Poland would have a calming effect, that they would defuse the explosive situation. That the strikers sought contact with the Church and that they asked for Church assistance we know from the Cardinal himself. But it is certain that the state, too, sought this contact and that it urged the Primate--undoubtedly the most influential personality in Poland--to issue a moderating appeal to the strikers. The Communists could justly hope that the Church would not do anything that could aggravate the situation. For both sides were agreed that outside intervention must be prevented.

The Primate's Czestochowa sermon shows that the Church considered the state's negotiating latitude to be more restricted than did the strikers in Gdansk and Szczeczyn. Thus the Cardinal tried to impel the workers to moderate their demands. He did not mean to say that they were going too far, but that the strikers should not try to win everything at once. Apparently, he feared the negotiations might fail on account of this--and for a while, this was indeed a distinct possibility. Thus it was not a question of restrictions or sacrifice, but of optimal tactics.

The Polish television network presented only fragments of the Primate's sermon; it goes without saying that it presented those that best conformed with the designs of the Party--i.e. the passages where the Primate spoke of duties and of the value of work, of industriousness, thrift and honesty, of a sense of responsibility for the entire population, of the right to strike, but also of the losses strikes could inflict on the national economy. There is hardly any longer speech of the Primate, in which he did not speak of work, industriousness, duty and honesty. Nevertheless, someone seeing only the excerpts from his sermon on television could gain the impression that the Primate had called for discontinuation of the strikes. In fact, quite a few people interpreted them in this way. But analysis of the text of the sermon does not vindicate this assumption.

Cardinal Wyszynski energetically protested against the unauthorized reproduction of parts of his sermon--which incidentally happened for the first time--on television and in the party papers for transparent purposes. In a pastoral letter of 2 September, in which he commented on the strike movement, the Cardinal mentioned this television broadcast which in part had been interpreted as a call to work and he pointed out what he had emphasized in his sermon. The emphasis had been on the statement that the restoration in Poland must begin with the total freedom of the Church in the execution of its pastoral task, with the primacy of the family and its economic situation, with the right to establish autonomous trade unions and other associations and finally, with the sovereignty of the nation in its own country. Indeed, these were the great subjects of his sermon, in which he also freely dispensed criticism: criticism of the atheistic propaganda, of the laicization of all areas of life, of the destruction of family life, of the immorality propagated for purposes of obtaining "hard currency", and of other aspects of government policy.

At the same time when parts of the Primate's sermon were presented on television and reprinted in newspapers, the state prohibited publication of a telegram sent by the Pope to the Primate and of a communique of the Central Council of the Polish Episcopate in the Krakow Catholic weekly TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY. It was only after agreement had been reached on the coast that they were published along with the full and authorized text of the Primate's sermon of 26 August (TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, 7 Aug 80). The authorized summary of the sermon was broadcast by Vatican Radio on 27 August. This support is remarkable and it is characteristic of the Pope's intense interest in the events in his country.

The Position of the Polish Episcopate

In a communique by the Central Council of the Polish Episcopate, which summarized the results of a conference in Czestochowa and which was much more direct and detailed than Cardinal Wyszynski's sermon, the Church commented on Poland's domestic situation. The Council stated that the economic, social and political tensions were a reflection of the people's long-standing displeasure over the mistakes made. Here, too, there is the obvious desire to relieve the tension. Thus the Episcopate paid tribute to both sides for their calm way of conducting the negotiations and it emphasized that the questions at issue must be solved through compromise and by the Poles themselves. But the Episcopate pointed out that prior to discontinuation of the strikes the state would have to give the appropriate guarantees and the agreements concluded would then have to be honored by both sides. But even under these circumstances, in this tense situation, the Church insisted on drawing attention to its demands, without fulfillment of which--in the opinion of the Church--domestic peace in Poland would be unattainable. The Church demanded: genuine religious liberty; full civil rights; the right to public instruction and education in accordance with the convictions of the citizens; the right to full and true information; liberty of opinion; the right to obtain the full truth on the country's history and culture. The Church demanded further: the right to the necessities of life for all citizens in accordance with their needs; the right to private property and to power of disposition in agriculture; the right to fair wages; the right to establish associations, above all free trade unions truly representing the interests of the workers. To a large extent, these demands are identical with those of the strikers on the coast, which thus were officially supported by the highest authority in Poland.

As compared to Cardinal Wyszynski's sermon, the Church's communique informed the state much more clearly that the Church wanted a peaceful settlement of the conflict with the workers and that it was willing to help bring about such a settlement; it pointed out, however, that such a settlement could not come about without appropriate collaboration on the part of the state. The Church made it perfectly clear that it expected fulfillment of its own, long-standing wishes and that without its collaboration there could be no peace, order and satisfaction in Poland. According to the communique, the Polish people are in need of genuine moral and social restoration; such restoration would rekindle the people's faith in themselves and in the future and would establish a trustful relationship between them and the rulers. The communique logically concludes that without observance of the rights demanded here for the Polish population and the Church, such restoration would not be feasible (TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, 7 Sep 80).

At present, it is not yet possible accurately to determine the past and present positions of the Catholic intellectuals in the dramatic conflict in Poland. It is certain that like the Church they have been supporting--directly and through numerous cross-connections--the demands of the workers and that they have influenced the formulation of these demands. I am referring here above all to the personalities of the authentic "Znak" Group, which presently is not represented in the Sejm, to the Catholic intellectuals rallying around the weeklies ZNAK and WIEZ and to the clubs of the Catholic intelligentsia. This is entirely in keeping with their past activities and with their objective--democratization of all aspects of life in Poland. Thus Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the editor in chief of the Catholic weekly WIEZ, played a leading role in the commission of experts of the Gdansk Umbrella Strike Committee.

Accomplishments and Dangers

There is no doubt that in securing the agreements on the coast the workers had scored a success. The agreements relieved the tension, but they did not end the crisis. This was clear to all parties involved. The victory of the workers on the Baltic Sea encouraged others to go on strike. A wave of walkouts moved across the country; it extended to regions that so far had been quiet. The workers pointed to the promises made by the state in the port cities and they demanded similar written agreements. In some places, the workers also expressed special wishes that were related to local conditions and to their professional concerns. And at times a new element was added: the demand for changes in the local enterprise administrations and party organizations. It was obvious that the workers' self-confidence had grown. But here, too, the workers never called into question the Party's leading role in the state or Poland's affiliation with the Warsaw Pact or its CEMA membership. In general, the workers showed discipline and prudence. Some of the new walkouts, e.g. those in the industrial region of Upper Silesia, were especially troublesome for the state, since they hit the national economy at a very sensitive spot. The strike movement gave the country no rest. In most cases, government commissions patterned after those in Gdansk and Szczecin quickly reached agreement with the strikers by making the concessions demanded, even though the distrust and fear that they might not be honored sometimes greatly complicated the negotiations. Stanislaw Kania, the new first secretary of the Party, went to the strike centers on the coast and in Upper Silesia; however, he did not talk to the workers--as Gierek had done in 1970--but conducted discussions with the local party leaders. This was not likely to have an encouraging effect on the workers,

but Kania showed himself to be willing to meet some of the crucial demands of the strikers. It remains to be seen whether the party purges that have been initiated a short time ago and that are directed against corrupt elements will lead to a genuine self-purification. In view of similar attempts in the past, there is good reason to remain skeptical. Again, it remains to be seen to what extent Kania is committed to this project and whether he is going to advance it. At present, it appears that the impetus is for the most part coming from below. For all that, the workers, too, ousted unpopular, high-ranking party functionaries, e.g. the first secretary of Katowice, Zdzislaw Grudzien, and the first secretary of Poznan, Jerzy Zasada; they had become intolerable for the party leadership as well. They were replaced by the Politburo member Andrzej Zabinski and the former ambassador to Bucharest, Jerzy Kuniak.

The main problem was and is the establishment of the new independent trade unions. Very soon, there emerged in many cities founding committees, which tackled this task. Everywhere, there was a rush to participate in these preparations. Not only the workers, but also other occupational groups wanted independent trade unions. In the end, even the lecturers and students at a number of universities and technical colleges called for independent unions. In Warsaw and other big cities, counseling centers have been established, in which volunteers advise the worker delegations on technical and legal matters. The new trade unions are subject to registration. The difficulties are considerable. Room, equipment and funds are in short supply. The established trade unions, which are fighting for their life, and local party organs at various levels tried and are still trying to slow down the workers. By boosting the material incentives, they tried to stem the mass withdrawal from the state trade unions. More or less oblique threats and concrete obstacles are to block the formation of the new trade unions. There have been clashes and threats of new walkouts. The party apparatus--concerned about its sinecure--frequently has been obstructing the workers on the local level. The unionizing workers had good reason to criticize the information policy of the mass media.

For the time being, the formation of the new trade unions was not seriously hampered. In Gdansk, the railroad workers resolved to withdraw in a body from the Central Trade Union Council. They want their own independent union. On 18 September, Gdansk workers published an official communique concerning the establishment of an association of independent trade unions that will be representing approximately 3 million workers. This resolution was adopted by representatives of over 300 local chapters, which at the same time elected Lech Walesa chairman. A few days later, the new association was to be officially registered in Warsaw. This is only the beginning--the great clash with the state trade unions is yet to come. In this regard, a great many things remain unclear. It is hard to imagine that the Party would give up its proverbial belt of transmission to the working masses, unless it can be certain that this will not topple its power structure. It remains to be seen how much latitude the Party will give the independent trade unions and how independent they will be. In this area, there is great potential for friction. The attack launched in Moscow's PRAVDA (20 Sep 80) is alarming. In this attack, the independent trade unions are not mentioned, but reference is made to elements that allegedly are supported by the West and that aim to split the Polish workers and to get Poland off the socialist course. The first sharp attack on Walesa by the Polish press was equally ominous. On 19 September, GLOS PRACY, the organ of the Central Trade Union Council--quoting the Paris paper LE FIGARO--accused Walesa

of having collaborated with Polish antisocialist forces--above all a certain Leszek Moczulski.

In some respects, the most recent developments in Poland resemble the wave of liberalization of 1956. Today, too, one observes some kind of restoration movement in the intellectual and cultural areas. Scientists, writers, artists, journalists and students are clearly expressing their intention not to lag behind the workers. The demand for liberty of opinion and the right to publish--as formulated by the strikers in Gdansk--is their demand. They themselves would not have been able to enforce it. Only the workers were in a position to wrest this concession from the Party. Fulfillment of this demand would give fresh impetus to culture, art and science in Poland. In this area, the link between the intellectuals and the coastal workers fighting for their rights is especially evident. The appeal of the 64 intellectuals, which urges the Party and the Government to enter into negotiations with the umbrella strike committees, contains the statement that the workers are fighting for their own rights and at the same time for the right of the intelligentsia to a better and more dignified life. In this struggle--states the appeal--the Polish progressive intelligentsia is siding with the strikers. The signatories of the appeal urge both sides to show moderation and the willingness to compromise, but they emphasize that the demand for free trade unions--a basic right of the workers--must be met (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 22 Aug 80). In the meantime, the state has not only met some of the material demands of the strikers; it has also relaxed its censorship, even though no new legal regulations have as yet been passed. Under the old order, the speeches delivered by the independent deputies Jan Szczepanski and Karol Malczynski at the Sejm session of 5 September would never have been published (the speech of the former verbatim, ZYCIE WARSZAWY, 8 Sep 80).

In the meantime, the Church and the State have likewise reached agreement on an important issue. According to this agreement, beginning on 21 September the radio network will every Sunday transmit a live broadcast of a divine service. The first service was broadcast on that Sunday. At the same time, the Church issued a pastoral letter, in which it demanded access to all of the state-controlled mass media. The workers obtained for the Church what the Church had for years been demanding in vain. The alliance between the Church and the working masses has proved successful and it has benefited both sides. Upon the termination of the strikes on the coast, Lech Walesa was received by Cardinal Wyszynski for extensive talks and he was invited to an audience with the Pope; however, with due regard for the dangerous situation in Poland, this audience has been put off to a later date.

It is by no means certain that the positive results negotiated by the striking workers can be maintained. Moscow's attitude toward this experiment is clear: It regards the independent trade unions as a serious threat. Thus one is inclined to be pessimistic. But irrespective of the future developments, the events after July 1980 have changed Poland. For the first time, the working masses have truly felt their own power and significance. And no matter whether the workers will be getting what the state has promised them or what they will be getting, one thing cannot be taken away from them. They have demonstrated to themselves and to the workers in the entire Soviet sphere of influence that they--united, prudent and determined--can wrest concessions even from a totalitarian state. The most recent events in Poland have given the workers in East Europe new self-confidence. (Manuscript completed on 21 September 1980).

YOUTH REPRESENTATIVES EXPRESS VIEWS ON RECENT EVENTS

Warsaw STUDENT in Polish No 18, 11 Sep 80 pp 3, 4

[Article by Maria Paluch and Jerzy S. Latka: "A Report on the Spot"]

[Text] Marek Siwiec, secretary of the Krakow Board of the SZSP [Socialist Union of Polish Students]:

The central issue is the lesson for the future to be drawn from the existing situation. Perhaps, it is the fact that fundamental societal concepts are not to be confused with the infallibility of responsible individuals on different levels of the management and administration structure. For 35 years socialism has been reigning in our country. Over these years its foundations have gained acceptance in many social spheres within and outside the party alike. The meaning of the word "socialism" has thus become richer in substance, but at the same time more complex. It is unfavorable that a formalized, one-sided picture of authority has become ingrained in the minds of our society.

I would say, everybody is entitled to speak out. However, the outlook of the majority should be in force for everybody.... We are witnessing a good deal of false pretense, hypocrisy and injustice around us. People desire socialism not as a holiday slogan, but as a reality of everyday life. Everybody has come to feel mature and responsible for his future.... We need genuine self-government, because keeping up the bureaucratic facade has become useless. This is the moment for historically reconciling a particular matter of conscience by persons and social institutions: which of the commonly mentioned blunders and distortions have been in part my fault?

It has been stated time and time again in the SZSP that we were needed exactly to the degree to which we were able to formulate the students' interests and bring about their realization. Have we met these conditions? We have voiced opinions of the student community on most every issue, especially on the occasion of our frequent conferences with the party leaders. These were the sincere and honest views of the student community, because they were voiced by the students themselves. There was a sphere of broader issues and postulates, for which we had to give up any hope of realization. Unfortunately, we have come to believe that the students cannot change the state of affairs as they have found it to be in certain fields of activity. May those who have watched the practical activity of the SZSP decide on our exclusive share of fault in the inefficiency of the

organization.... Settling accounts with the present should come out positively. The line of reasoning which the SZSP has been fostering for quite some time is taking hold in the country.

J. S., graduate in ethnography.

I have to admit that I was surprised by the political maturity of the Polish workers. In mid-August, after perhaps a dozen years, I met an old friend from elementary school. The friend had completed his education when he graduated from that school; now he is working at a plant in Tarnow. I was impressed by his knowledge and experience and, what is most important, by the authenticity of his thought. We, the graduates of universities and institutes of technology, have had our minds soaked up to the marrow of our bones with slogans that have been hammered in, no matter whether we believe them or not. We could learn a lot from the people whose main school has been life itself.

My appreciation is also due to the other side. As a nonmember of the party I feel that the party has emerged more powerful from this conflict because of how the dispute has been settled. I am convinced that there is an opportunity to extend the August dialogue with the shipyard workers to a dialogue of the party with society at large. Let us not deceive ourselves--had there been no discrepancy between the trumpeted slogans and reality, the strikes would not have come about. I believe that we are entering a time of dialogue, centering not only on a better tomorrow, but, even more importantly, on the dignity of our lives. I believe that the signing of the agreement was the beginning of a process which will result in a socialism that means social and moral order, a society which for centuries has been yearned for.

However, one condition has to be met in order not to let the wave of enthusiasm generated in the tense days of August die down. Namely, the people must be thoroughly informed and allowed an opportunity to speak out. There is no democracy without criticism, and without democracy we will not construct socialism.

Jacek Stefanski, secretary of ZK [the Krakow Board] of the SZSP.

An attempt to define the reasons of the phenomenon, with which we have had to deal over the last several weeks, is very difficult. I believe that much time will have to elapse before we can form a comprehensive and clear picture of it. The incongruity of publicly announced truths with the reality of the functioning of the state political and administrative apparatus has given rise to a deep crisis of confidence of our society in the loosely interpreted notion of institutions and all institutionalized activities. I think that this has also occurred as a consequence of failures in domestic policy, both economic and social, in recent years. We have brought up those matters more than once in our statements. Last year at the annual conference of the SZSP leadership in Uniejow, we addressed the matter of propaganda activities, among other things. The response we received was as follows: the mass media are implementing a program which is in full accordance with the needs and expectations of our society, whereas your point of view is impractical and has no substance to it.

The present mood has also been caused by the awakening of social needs. In the beginning of the seventies, an array of concepts emerged to raise the standard of living of the average Polish family, for example, a cheap car, apartments for everybody, and so on. Under the conditions of the late 70's, this has proved to be unrealistic....

In this context we cannot ignore the shameful subject of corruption which has spread to many spheres of our life, including the most sensitive ones, such as health care. A complicated system of connections between either persons or entire economic units has sprung up and leads to an immense off-the-market turnover of products. We can keenly feel this especially in services and trade. This is a result of shortcomings in the economic life of our country.

Apathy is caused by the lack of a proper relationship between the individual value of a person and his place in society. A backlash is produced against the tendency to make people uniform, against the statistical approach to social processes and against forgetting the fact that society is made up of individual personalities who have their own needs and their own unique system of comprehending the outside world.

I will end with a statement that might be trivial. I believe that, at the root of the phenomenon to which we have become witnesses in recent weeks, there was a conviction among the majority of our society that comprehensive reforms were a necessity. If we view it as a manifestation of political maturity of the larger part of our society, this should be a positive sign.

Ryszard Stelmach, senior at AM (Medical College), head of the self-government council of DS (student dormitory).

Offhand, it seems to me that allowing the trade unions to be independent is important. Until now there has been little opportunity to bring up sensitive issues, much less raise an objection. The administration and the government will have to reckon with the position of the workers from now on.

To me as a student, this strike and the signing of the agreement is important from yet another standpoint. It destroys some erroneous theories that we have been stuffed with at the universities. We were taught that, in a socialist society, there could not be contradictions to the extent that there was no place for strikes. However--and there is hardly any doubt as to this--a strike can be instrumental in bringing about the intensification of, or maybe, a return to democracy.

I do not really have to add that the shipyard workers protested also on our behalf.

Dr (docent) Jacek Majchrowski, political scientist, age 33, member of the PZPR.

If the commitments that have been made are going to be honored, there is hope of starting a process of genuine democracy. In my view, socialism is supposed to mean democracy by implication. However, we have to remodel certain structures

in order to let this process develop fully. A genuine socialist democracy requires modifications in the work of the Board for Control of the Press and Entertainment. I can understand that there are military, political and economic secrets and their reasons for being (...)

Then there is a broader and more important issue. There is a definition which fitted our situation very well--"stage management of political life." There was a stage and applauding audience in front of it. There also was a backstage which was inaccessible to the general public. It would be wise to put an end to this and to introduce, in the name of socialist democracy, a modern, open theatre of political life where the actors mingle with the audience.

The causes of the present economic situation were several. Looking for them, we cannot ignore the role of science and primarily the ways out of this impasse. Schools have to be self-governed, and their administration must be elective. This was the case only 12 years ago. Introduction of the system of appointed chancellors and deans could not but influence their work. It seems to me that those who work at the university have a better knowledge of people, of who could handle what, and what his inclinations are--than any official in charge of nomination. An argument has been put forward to the effect that universities are organizations which are too huge to entrust to persons without adequate qualifications. To tackle administrative and financial issues the chancellor relies on the manager and the bursar, whereas his responsibility is to take care of the university's development. An appointed chancellor would always mirror the opinion of the authority which appointed him, and an elected chancellor would reflect the opinion of the senate which elected him to his position. Generally speaking, the minister can endorse the choice, but should not decide on it.

Another extremely important issue is the hard currency funds of universities. If there is no elementary equipment, if there is no opportunity to import basic books, and if there are strict limitations on acquisition of scientific magazines, there must be some consequences. We are not always able to cover even the costs of travel to scientific congresses abroad and thus we often are out of contact with world science. Sometimes we are asked why we have not had any Nobel Prize winners for so many years. But how could we have had any, given the under developed conditions of our scientists in comparison with the world leaders?... We cannot be serious about the development of industry without considering basic research; even agriculture today requires research and investment.

Conditions of recruitment of new research personnel also have some important consequences. In theory, the best should stay on; in practice, this happens to those who have apartments and wish to work for the kind of salary offered. If we are to hire the best, let us give them an apartment and the kind of salary they deserve. A reported reorganization of the wage structure is also necessary among the research personnel. A professor can make 75 zlotys an hour. He is a professional with the highest qualification in his field in the country, qualification which has been attested to by the Council of State. At the same time any ordinary plumber would charge 200 zlotys, if not more, an hour.

Launching new programs in schools with no scientific cadre to attend to them is of fatal consequence to our economy. A history program, for instance, has been

introduced at the WSP [Higher Pedagogical School] in Rzeszow, where they only had one associate professor. To top it off, an admission quota has been authorized for the first year that is two or even three times more than that of the Jagiellonian University, which had a dozen full professors, excluding associate professors.

Unfortunately, there are many problems as significant as these.

Krzysztof Kosinski, a junior in political science, member of the PZPR.

I support the workers' position in its entirety. What is, to my mind, the blunder in our economy? It is primarily the situation in which the work of every plant is conducted by guerrilla methods. It leans on the so-called "golden hands" that would go here and there, grease a palm here in one way, grease a palm there in another, and somehow fix it all. Our economy has experienced a lack of economic mechanisms; now we have an opportunity to set the mechanisms in motion.

I hope that we will, after all, get rid of make-believe activities which are some of the greatest nightmares of our economic, social and political life. I remember from my schoolboy years some examples of it in volunteer work. I think, and I stress it once again, that the most important achievement is a change in thinking. The strikes have left a lasting impact in the shape of independent trade unions, and thus, in my judgment, a certain process has begun....

Aleksandra Dobrowolska, a graduate of the Academy of Music, PZPR candidate.

What can I say specifically about the present situation in the country? We would better wait and see what comes out of it. Perhaps it is too early for evaluations.

I think that the party and government began to act in the moments of crisis from the negative side. They began to relieve people of their responsibilities from the top. What do I care about the exact names tied to those chairs.... I think that the fact of strikes having come about is in itself frightful. This, however, has been brewing for years....

We had a party meeting during the strikes. We spoke about what we thought--mainly because somebody at last had begun taking interest in our opinion. Until then I had a feeling of complete impotence.

I do not know whether it will change for the best, but we are presented with an opportunity to make changes. Taking advantage of it is up to all of us. As I have already said, we would better reserve judgment on the present situation in the country. Let us see what will come out of it really, whether the conditions needed to take this opportunity exist....

Wieslaw Slezak, AM [Academy of Music] graduate.

Maybe we will succeed in changing our life somewhat. At the student military training session where I have been recently, we discussed the Gdansk events more than once. To tell the truth we did not know till the very end what kind of demands the shipyard workers had put forth. One of my fellow students criticized the strikers by maintaining that this was nonsense. I do not praise the strikes, but they have brought on a dialogue. It is well that it has worked out this way. A question remains--was it worth the price....

ERRONEOUS VIEWS ON FOUNDED OF WALLACHIA, MOLDAVIA REFUTED

Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA in Romanian 29 Jan 81 p 19

[Article by Emil Puscaiu: "The Historic Tradition in Regard to the Founding of the Romanian States"]

[Excerpts] The Eminescu Publishing House has republished in the collection "Filosofia culturii romanesti" [The Philosophy of Romanian Culture], the valuable book by historian Gheorghe I. Bratianu entitled "Traditia istorica despre intemeierea statelor romanesti" [The Historic Tradition in Regard to the Founding of the Romanian States]. This is a work which encompasses the horizons of the historic past of the Romanian people, especially under the aspect of the tradition, with historic roots, in regard to the founding of the Romanian states.

The work of the historian, university professor and academician is preceded by a comprehensive introduction signed by Valeriu Raeanu, the director of the Eminescu Publishing House, which describes objectively the stormy period between 1916 and 1944 with its political upheavals, up to the installation of the new political regime after 23 August 1944, the period in which Gh. I. Bratianu served as the head of the liberal party which had split off from the old party. This trip into the recent past of our country was necessary not only for the portrayal of the personality of the historian Bratianu on the political level but also for an understanding of the socioeconomic events which occurred before this and which imposed a state form on Romania by means of an historic revolution. Secondly, the thorough introduction of Valeriu Raeanu is an illustrative presentation of the work of the historian, pointing out the expanse of the Romanian and foreign historical material used by Gh. Bratianu, including his numerous earlier works.

The method of thinking and of creation of Gh. Bratianu is based, to a large extent, on the philosophical system of Hegel. Using synthesis according to the law of the Hegelian rhythm, Gh. Bratianu retains the positive aspects of the thesis and antithesis, fully restoring the authority and authenticity of the historic tradition applied as a source of information, chiefly, to shed light on the historic conditions under which Wallachia and Moldavia were established.

After analyzing the documentary value of the historic tradition over the centuries Gheorghe Bratianu moves on to the subject of his book--which has as a preamble the chapter devoted to the Asanesti, the history of the Romanians in the Balkans. At first sight, it seems paradoxical that the Wallachian-Bulgarian empire or tsarate would be founded by a dynasty composed of the brothers Petru

and Asan and consolidated by Ionita (Petru's brother) who received from Pope Innocent III, along with his blessing, the confirmation, by an exchange of letters, of his Latin origin, as the documents of the Papal Office for the years 1199-1202 prove. To these documents are added some traditions which other documents, especially the Greek chronicle of Nicetas Choniates Akominatos, record.

The historian Bratianu, along with the majority of Romanian and foreign historians, explains this situation by the existence, at the beginning of the 12th century, of a compact mass of Romanians named Vlachs, located--as shepherds--in the region between the Balkans and the Danube of present-day Bulgaria, "Romanians which disappeared in the following centuries," among the preponderant Slavic element. And the historian says, in a progressive and expressive style, in regard to the fate of the Romanian people as it was defined in history, "...they were not to be Balkan but Danubian and, especially, Carpathian. Around this mountain stronghold, they were to establish their historic tradition, along with their existence as a state."

Thus we enter into the central and most important part of the book reviewed: the historic tradition of the founding of Wallachia and the historic tradition of Moldavia, before and after the founding, as well as of the voivodeships in Transylvania.

The tendencies "completely opposed to this which have appeared in the historiography of our neighbors," pointed out by Bratianu, are, to say the least, bizarre. Some of them use the existence of the Asanestis as the basis of the "well-known theory of the origin of the Romanian people in the Balkans and of their later immigration to the northern territory of the Danube and the slopes of the Carpathians (the Rossler theory). Others eliminate them completely not only from the history of the Romanians between the Danube and the Carpathians but also from that of the Aromanians--the Macedonian-Romanians--of the Balkan peninsula, looking for another origin than Romanian for these people."

The historic tradition of the settling of Wallachia, attributed to Negru Voda, the supposed founder from Fagaras, a "legendary character deeply rooted in the minds of the people," is combated both by Bratianu and by our contemporary historians. Headed by C. C. Giurescu, they consider that "the founding of Muntenia was not the result of some founders coming from Fagaras but of the gathering, under a single Romanian rule, of the different political groups: principalities and voivodeships, from the right and left banks of the Olt." Gh. Bratianu took on the task of relegating the historic tradition of the founding of Wallachia by the legendary "Negru Voda" to its natural place, placing this important historical event at the end of the 13th century.

In contradiction with his own earlier works our historian dares to present rather convincing arguments to support his new reasoning of the possibility of a colonization by Negru Voda from Transylvania in Wallachia. The principal argument presented is the similarity between the founding of Moldavia, which is accepted by the entire Romanian and foreign historiography, supported by documents--and the founding of Wallachia since the same causes produce the same effects in similar situations.

"Indeed," the historian says, "one of the essential causes of the two settlements was the deep dissatisfaction of the Romanian voivodes from Transylvania in regard to the exclusion of the Romanian nationality from the ranks of the privileged orders from which only the Hungarians, Saxons and Szeklers benefited in the Middle Ages. To this could be added the violation of the rights of the peasants to own farm land which gave the first impetus to emigration." Therefore, a general worsening of living conditions for Transylvanian Romanians, also manifested through religious persecution, since the Transylvanian Romanians were Eastern-rite Christians and the Hungarians, the dominant element, were Catholics. These are some of the reasons for emigration from Transylvania to Wallachia and Moldavia. In addition, this emigration to Wallachia by some of the Romanian nobles and people from Transylvania under the leadership of "Radu Negru Voivode, great 'herteg' [leader] from Almas and Fagaras" is noted in the well-known text of the Anonymous Chronicle Writer. In conclusion, even if Radu Negru, a legendary character, is a real person, the important thing is the colonization of Wallachia from Transylvania which "restores to Transylvania its natural role as cradle of the Romanian state, just as philological and linguistic research have restored to it its role as cradle of the Romanian language and of the Romanian people," as the author whose work we are discussing says so clearly.

The colonization of Moldavia is the most complex and most diversified part, rich in circumstances of historic tradition proven by written sources. We note, in particular, the expansion of the parallel nature of the two colonizations, Muntenia [Wallachia] and Moldavia, by comparing them with the historic traditions of the past in regard to legends such as: the Song of Roland, the Nibelungenlied and, especially, the legend of William Tell. This excursion through comparative European history under circumstances of the medieval past with symbolic figures specific to the Middle Ages helps the author to attempt to portray a structural conception of tradition as a source of history, with the just conclusion that "the complete rejection of an historic tradition, simply because some of its elements have legendary aspects, is as much of a mistake as its total adoption, without any discernment or with practically no contribution of the critical spirit."

In regard to the colonization of Moldavia, written history is intertwined with legends. The historian Bratianu treats in his work the founding of the Romanian states in parallel development, with new arguments based not only on the relating of incidents of a political and economic order but also, on their interpretation, which shows a superior concept of history on the part of the author, as Valeriu Rapceanu says in his introduction.

In this interpretation of the historic tradition of the two colonizations, logic has its say by asking the natural question as to whether the real event of the colonization of Moldavia was not the result of the example of the other real event of another colonization which took place a half a century earlier, in Muntenia, for identical reasons and with similar results.

In support of this point of view, in addition to the political factor of the oppression by the Hungarian royal authorities of the indigenous Romanian population, is the economic factor of the "commercial needs of the Saxon cities of Transylvania," crystallized after the establishment of the state system of

Wallachia by the signing of treaties in the 13th century with the voivodes of this country, as well as the need to transport grain on the Danube to the ports at the mouth of the river, "the loading place for grain for the Genoese and the Venetians." All these reasons are evidence of the existence of local political groupings which, after the colonization from Transylvania by the voivode who founded Wallachia, united under his scepter, be he the legendary Negru Voda or Radu Basarab.

Romanian historiography records, on the basis of a tradition preserved by historic sources, different political and economic groupings in Moldavia, with a denser population in the Siret Basin before the two colonizations by Dragos and Bogdan. The latter, coming from Maramures, brought about real independence for Moldavia. When he broke away from the sovereignty of Hungary he was called "notorious infidel" by the king of Hungary, according to a document dated 15 September 1349.

The work reviewed mentions, in accordance with historic truth, that when they were first founded both Romanian principalities had a special importance in the international situation of the times because of their geographic location, in the path of barbarous attacks. "Our old historical tradition," says the historian Bratianu, "restores to Transylvania its natural role as cradle of the state just as linguistic and philological research have restored its role as cradle of the Romanian language and people."

We remember that the voivodeship of Transylvania "is an ancient indigenous political reality in Transylvania and not a creation of the Hungarian kings, representing from its origin, a system of law and a Romanian-Slavic state policy." Bratianu says that this was "completely different from that of the Hungarian settlers and organizations of a Western type introduced by the first kings of Hungary in these parts." These conclusions which prove historic tradition are confirmed by the chronicle of the Anonymous Notary of the Hungarian King Bela, called the Chronicles of the Anonymous Writer.

We cannot give the entire reasoning of the book but we will give its conclusions which, in tribute to the views and interpretation of our great historian, A. D. Xenopol "in regard to the process of the founding and development of the Romanian states in the Middle Ages," are integrated in the absolute logic of this scholar. In the 1896 French edition of his History of the Romanians, the historian Xenopol combats the fantastic theory of Hungarian historiography that Transylvania was abandoned by the Romanians before it was occupied by the Hungarians and that later they returned to Transylvania from the south of the Danube through Muntenia--a hypothesis which rules out the settling of a Transylvanian voivode in Wallachia and gives the following view of the real state of affairs.

Xenopol explains clearly the continuity of the Daco-Roman element in Transylvania and in the Romanian Principalities as well as the colonization of Wallachia by Romanians from Transylvania by their voivodes, presenting an important historical fact: "The successive shifting of the capital of Wallachia, which, first of all, is Cispulung, near the Transylvanian border, and, later, drops down to Arges and then Tirgoviste and finally ends up in the plains, in Bucharest. If the

Romanians had come from south of the Danube and if we were to look there for the origin of their state, it is obvious that their first capital would have to be located on the river bank and then the capital would have moved to the upper part of the country. However, the opposite occurred."

This is the crowning point of the work of the historian Bratianu, seen through the prism of a work written a half a century earlier, which demonstrates the close and enduring continuity of tradition in Romanian historiography.

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

CEAUSESCU'S ECONOMIC BOOK PUBLISHED--Bucharest, 24 Jan (Agerpres)--The series of selected writings from President Nicolae Ceausescu's economic thinking has been enriched with a new volume "Afirmarea si Intarirea Independentei Economice a Romaniei" (Assertion and Consolidation of Romania's Economic Independence) recently put out by the Political Publishing House. In a review published in the January 24 issue of SCINTEIA Gheorghe Dobre, Dsc., from the Institute of Socialist Economy of Bucharest, considers the volume as a prestigious contribution to the progress of contemporary economic science. [Excerpt] [AU242020 Bucharest Agerpres in English 1830 GMT 24 Jan 81]

CSO: 2020

EX-PREMIER RIBICIC FRANK, ASSERTIVE IN INTERVIEW

Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian No 310, 10 Dec 80 pp 14-17

[Interview with ex-Premier Mitja Ribicic by Jelena Lovric]

[Text] It would be hard to say that Mitja Ribicic is a typical politician, even though he spent his entire life in very important political functions. In the forties, he organized the liberation movement in Syria and Carinthia, and he even knew how to write poems. The people adopted many of them later on, and not long ago, they were returned to the author compiled into a collection.

In 1969, when, after numerous postwar assignments, particularly party assignments, he became head of the Federal Executive Council the reporters awaited him as a advocate of "playing with an open deck," and during his many years in Belgrade, they took note of his "courageous speeches," (especially the one at the First LCY Conference), which he himself asserts were only the handling of unpopular and sensitive matters. He is remembered for having been the first to speak Slovenian from the rostrum of the United Nations that many times he had said how it is "better to go down fighting than to hang around waiting for the end to come" (and he conducted himself according to this principle), he pleaded for politicians to view their functions in a more normal way--he would live in a most ordinary apartment unit, and he wouldn't even ride on a bicycle...He tells jokes about himself (as premier, he immediately became the butt of friendly witticisms); even in Belgrade, he did not relinquish his Slovenian national passion--mushroom hunting ("Belgrade residents do not do that: they say that only Slovenes and Gypsies gather mushrooms").

Later on, talking about the successes (and failures) of the government during his term of office, he would say that "there was a considerable number of critics including hidden critics, and all of us would like to see more culture in politics rather than having politics in culture." In admitting that several years ago, being the wittiest socio-political worker, he was

tagged by the Slovenian humor paper PAVLIHA (which is read by all Slovenes of any worth), he writes that in the "realization of the lofty goals of humanity, in spite of the barbs of criticism in his spirit, he maintained his faith in man."

Currently, Ribicic is President of the Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People [SAWP] of Slovenia, an organization whose name, he says, the workers cannot even pronounce, and which, he also maintains--in accordance with the allocation of functions among the socio-political organizations--is responsible for everything that is no good ("everything that is good is done by the party.") Even after a heavy day's work, he is glad to meet with news reporters: recently, without showing any visible fatigue, he began to talk to us about the current political situation.

[Question] Until recently, it was considered in our country that our economic situation was really bad, but that our political situation was good. Things are always bad with the economy. What is the political situation like for us today?

[Answer] You cannot separate the material base of society from consciousness. If our economy is bad, then it is clear that our political situation cannot be any better. Those statements on the favorable political situation were connected with the extraordinary situation, in which the Yugoslav nation found itself because of Tito's illness. These events were shaking up all of our peoples and national minorities, the entire Yugoslav nation, every Yugoslav, we experienced war and revolution, postwar difficulties, and all the things we had to overcome, everything that Tito really meant to this country. This was a moment at which every person in Yugoslavia was asking himself the question: what next? This was a time of plebiscite support of our self-managed socialist system, the system that we built, of fraternity and unity, solidarity, friendship, and the support of our independent position in the world.

[Question] Do you think that it was only for this reason that the situation did not reach its inevitable fate, in this case, the negative influence of the economy on the political situation?

[Answer] It's like this: if a similar situation would occur today, or if certain external pressures on our countries, or some organized internal enemy would come into play--and such tendencies do exist--then our people would again react in the same way as during the time of our President's illness, they would be just as unified. This is a constant that does not lose value in this difficult economic and political situation. Anyway, I think that both the leadership of Yugoslavia and all those responsible for the policy of this country were in some way stunned by the illness of Comrade Tito, and it was perhaps natural that they did a little postponing of certain economic and other problems, and that these problems piled up much more than before. I would say that there was justified opportunism at that time. Perhaps it could be justified...

[Question] If not justified, at least it should be understood...

[Answer] Yes, it is understandable, even though it really created headaches for us. Because we were very late in beginning to ready our stabilization policy and in preparing certain extraordinary measures of the Federal Executive Council in current economic policy and agreements of republics and provinces on the developmental policy for the coming year. Currently, we have to say that the political situation in our country is different than what it was during the first months of this year: it is more politicized. Even now, the working class does not pose a question of an alternative to the self-management system, but it asks: how? It is no longer unified in its answer to this question. One part of it that is somewhat interested in inflation and in easier work insists on the continuation of this "easier policy." The other part of the working class more than anything else wants to share the burden with those who work poorly. This is the way it is in all parts of our society. Stabilization policy is that demarcation line on which the class warfare is being fought today: do we want to continue further with with some kind of etatist centralized distribution of resources, or to have it so that everyone counts on his own income, on his own dinar, so that in his own development, and in the development of his own work organization, community, opcina, and his own republic, he does not wait for something to "come down from the heavens," but depends only on what he himself has created. Yugoslavia is faced with a battle with etatism. With etatist alienation of funds, which shows up in the foreign economic policy area as a euphoria of receiving foreign credits, and on the domestic scene as a predominance of credit relationships, with the policy of emissions, printing money, and rolling in funds. The question is, how do we open up new perspectives without Tito, without Kardelj, and without some others who created this, our socialist community, at the present time.

[Question] There is no doubt that we wish to continue further along Tito's road. However, it seems that faintheartedness, confusion and a feeling of helplessness is manifesting itself among the people, along with a doubt as to whether we are capable, without Tito and Kardelj, to solve the accumulated difficulties, in order to continue along his road?

[Answer] It seems to me that there is a fear among the people as to whether our self-management system is sufficiently efficient, and whether it will be able to overcome all of those dangers that are threatening it, both external and internal. But this fear, at the same time, is also a pressure on us, on the republic etatistic organs, not to behave as etatists, but to really demand that which is in the interest of the people, and in the interest of the development of our self-management system. If, currently, at the end of the year, we reach four or five of the main large-scale federal agreements, which everyone is talking about, it will be a great relief for the people, they will breathe easier: even today it is possible for all of those who represent our republics and provinces to come to agreement on even the most sensitive matters.

For 1.5-2 years, we have been wasting our efforts on some discussions that were not of the greatest importance. I said in jest that we had our own kind of "cultural revolution," and that we believed in the illusion that through rapid change, the people can change their mutual relations, instead of insisting upon greater responsibility of a person regardless of how long his term of office had been.

[Question] Is it possible to ascribe our modest successes in the economy, which we devote a lot of talk to but do too little about, to this preoccupation with certain less important discussions (less important because we deal more with the formal side of the problem).

[Answer] As of now, we have in the main overcome these tendencies. But sometimes, we ourselves create confusion among the people. For example, we were saying that the function of the Federal Executive Council is not suited to the new self-management relations in the federation, and at the same time, we were forgetting the great responsibility upon the Federal Executive Council to create the conceptual plan of stabilization policy together with science and all creative organs of our society. We criticize it, we demean it, and it is needed by us. This is part of the reason why in recent times, we have not had a sufficiently firm, strong federal government, rather it's like a chicken with its head cut off; the republics have much more influence on it than would be natural in the current situation. The Federal Executive Council should be in dispute with practically every republic.

[Question] How did you go about it as premier?

[Answer] About like this. I was at loggerheads with the Slovenes about roads, with Bosnia about Bosanka krajina, with Vojvodina about the prices of farm products, with Serbia about financial easements for the Crvena zastava" Automotive Plant, and with the Croats about extrabudgetary balance. I do not think that the way that the Federal Executive Council as it operated at that time was ideal, but we need one nucleus in the federation which will provide its own alternatives and firm stands, and will rise or fall on them.

[Question] Were you always in favor of heading against the wind without regard to the consequences?

[Answer] I have always favored this, because I think that it is not tragic in a socialist system if the government fails. It is better that the government fails in the course of conceptual planning rather than to conduct a policy of compromise.

[Question] Can one get the impression that in recent times, it has become very difficult for us to attain agreement.

[Answer] The reason for this is that people think that our interests are unified *per se*. They are not. We differ in our interests and in our degree of development: in economic, cultural, and political development, you name it. I really do not think that the developed republics are the nucleus of an advanced self-managed system, or that the "club of the undeveloped," those who defend the fund for the undeveloped, are against self-management. That is not so. In every republic and province there are people both pro and con self-management. We have the only society in the world that makes agreements in this way, and even though we are a little slow in making agreements, our agreement is much more worthwhile because it is not attained through pressure.

[Question] It seems that practice does not back you up. There are many self-management agreements that no one is abiding by.

[Answer] Of course, because the agreement was reached by power of the state, the party, and the banks, and again life goes on and it is shown that the agreement is unrealistic. In this regard, one--justified--fear exists among the people; that of withdrawing from an agreement, but this fear would have to be transformed into a force of true worker control, which would make certain that what has been agreed on

really does exist. We can make an agreement that Yugoslavia attain an economic growth rate of 7 or 8 degrees, but there will be no driving force behind such a development.

[Question] We have very ambitious plans. The Western European countries are much more modest in their plans.

[Answer] Yes, we have very ambitious plans. Some think that the less credit from abroad we get, the worse it is. I think that this is good. It is good for nobody to give us any more credit. Perhaps, this will appear as some kind of anti-Yugoslav phenomenon, but life makes it necessary for us to depend upon our own resources for our own development. If we want to change our life, we will not have everything, the question is whether we want to spend 5 billion every year for petroleum. I do not think that our people are afraid of this, but it is important to remember that their sensitivity has increased toward our behavior, toward the behavior of the leaders. The match-up of our words to our deeds is being observed quite critically. People have become very sensitive, also, to such matters as driving around in Mercedes," and the housing credits that are obtained by some officials, and they are sensitive toward banquets, and various luxuries. Like all intelligent people, they know that you can nationalize all weekend cottages in the country, and you will never solve the housing problems. They react to details which are really marginal in nature, and to which they were not sensitive to a half-year before. And it goes without saying how sensitive they are to social inequities and to the accumulation of wealth.

[Question] How do you explain that?

[Answer] I think that this is the reflection of a worsening political situation. A reflection of lack of confidence and of disbelief. We have to overcome this. Not in such a way where we continue to drive around in Mercedes," and conduct banquets, but, let us say, that we recognize our protocol sensibly, and that we bring it into more modest limits. In this way, our workers will not be preoccupied with fringe issues, rather, we will open for them the prospect of handling our enormous economic questions of creating, distributing, and expending income.

[Question] This summer, one personnel change in your republic leadership evoked great attention and interest, perhaps in other republics more than in Slovenia. The departure of Comrade Vratusa from the post of Premier took place without disturbance, almost like a normal thing.

[Answer] True, we made this change in the executive council in agreement with Vratusa...

[Question] This was an unusual change, for the very reason that it did not appear to be a replacement. Everything was quite normal.

[Answer] It was normal, but for some people, however, it was like a shock, almost like some kind of political nonconfidence. In our country, there are no normal departures from functions, it is believed that every change in the government or in the central committee has to have something in back of it, that something is not right with the person concerned. This is our problem, much greater than the length of term of office. Our sensitivity to this, whether in this or in another

forum, in this or another important position, impedes us from making more rapid changes in the so-called structure. Look at our delegate assemblies alone: delegates have continued to sit in the assembly benches for more than 10 years already. Much more than this ought to have changed in 10 years time, however.

[Question] New situations require new people, different qualities, structures...

Answer] That is the way it is. In Slovenia, we figured out that during the current situation, we must convert the executive council through rapid restructuring into an operational stabilization headquarters, which would assume certain concrete responsibilities. We concluded, together with Vratusa, that what is needed by us in that position is a man of action, and not of thoroughly grounded knowledge, a person who would be young and tenacious...Vratusa's standing currently has only risen, because he attained the latitude and time to develop his own capabilities.

I think that the Federal Executive Council could also do the same thing. I do not think that Djuranovic has to submit his resignation, there is no need for that. But it is clear to all of us that the Federal Executive Council, as a unified team, has to feel itself on the Yugoslav plane. Ask the delegates in the Federal Assembly: comrades come before them from the Federal Executive Council, one with one proposal, another with another, and a third with a third proposal. As some documents show, telephone connections with the republics begin operating. Everything is somehow being calculated the way that someone will go. Everything is calculated in the federation, and this is that etatism, which is causing us great problems and causes us to stumble. I was in the federal government for 7 years. When I arrived, I said that I would make some changes in administration. All of them laughed, and made jokes and caricatures at my expense, and considered this to be an illusion. And I think they were right. In these 10 years, not much has changed in our administration--this is continuity...

[Question] Premiers pass on, and they stay...

[Answer] They stay and they are the power, they, who prepare documents and materials. There isn't a single one that you can say is not for the self-management system, and for socialism, but objectively, but such a one is really against it objectively. He objectively works against self-management and socialism. This is petty politics and also wheeling and dealing: You give me that, and I will give you this, and this is most dangerous for a self-managed society, which needs to come to agreements and to develop on self-management income relations. I think that it is necessary to heighten the responsibility of administration for certain acts for which there was no legal justification. For example, that matter of foreign indebtedness. For 3 years, we have been going into debt beyond all limits confirmed by social agreement. Here is that problem which you had referred to--people think: If they could depart from the agreement on such serious matters, then why couldn't they do the same on minor matters as well.

[Question] Thus, it appears that the wheeling and dealing and tense situations occur concerning the underdeveloped. This is a tough nut to crack. Anyhow, the underdeveloped are small in number, and the money is adding up. In recent times, efforts have been made to determine scientifically the optimal level both for the contributors and the receivers. The parties are coming out in favor of a fund or for the association of funds directly through work organizations. And it does not just concern money. The underdeveloped are also demanding personnel, technology, and know-how as well.

[Answer] I do not wish to attack the centralized fund for financing the underdeveloped to which, by virtue of the law, contributions are made, and from which, by estatist grace, funds are drawn, even though this kind of method is predominant. It is better for the underdeveloped to develop their own production forces directly, through the association of all interested parties. The current situation is much more slanted in favor of the underdeveloped areas (perhaps, Montenegro is a slight exception here.) Not only will we be shoveling in our current funds, but also the developed regions will invest as much as 20-30 percent of their associated labor funds, and their own problems will force them into this. Of course, this will have an effect on the processing industry in those regions also, especially since the developed areas of Yugoslavia are less and less able to invest in the extensive type of economy that requires a large number of workers...

[Question] This is especially the case in your republic. As far as I know, Slovenia has attained full employment.

[Answer] The circle is closed in Slovenia. There is no longer any opening of a large number of jobs. One time, Tito told Brandt: Why are our workers going to Germany for work, why don't the Germans bring their capital into Bosnia? This has also become an internal problem for Yugoslavia now. In Slovenia, there is no dilemma concerning the need to invest in underdeveloped regions, not via the fund, but directly, through associated labor. This way would be better for us and for them. For we have practically stripped Slovenia of all its raw materials. It has turned out that isolating ourselves within our own national boundaries is a source of difficulties, and that it causes great structural problems, and intensifies the dependence of our economy on the foreign markets.

[Question] In one of your very important speeches, at a time when stabilization policy was an urgent issue, you said that no form of consumption is sacred: you mentioned national defense, pensions, the underdeveloped...

[Answer] Yes, it was at the first conference of the LCY, which even President Tito attended. Kardelj told me later that with this speech, I placed a great load and great responsibility on my back. Today, what we need more than the control of individual areas of expenditure, is the study of all of these expenditures jointly. We are always doing this in bits and pieces: we look at the funds for the underdeveloped and we quarrel over them, and then the army, and the economic relations with foreign countries, instead of studying them in their entirety, within the limits of our capabilities. We have to tell the working class of Yugoslavia very clearly what kind of situation we are in. Tomorrow it will not be better, but we shall not halt our development and life, it's just that we have to behave differently, we cannot continue as we have been doing. We have to find the strength within ourselves so that even in this worldwide economic crisis and under difficult economic conditions, we can assert with cohesiveness that we shall affirm the fraternity and unity of our peoples on new foundations, for we can no longer hold up on the old ones.

[Question] Warnings have become more frequent that the front of antisocialist forces is gaining strength?

[Answer] Whenever we hesitated in the development of our political system, when we ourselves did not open up prospects concerning the greatest, most strategic, and universal questions of the development of our society--and such a situation did occur

in recent years, we created conditions whereby anything under the sun could germinate on this bed devoid of prospects. And even our opposition forces get into the act as soon as the international relations become touchy, when speculation and lack of confidence in Yugoslavia as an independent and nonaligned country intensify.

[Question] For a short time already, foreign propaganda has left us in peace. Again it is striking out with ever increasing force. Here, Slovenia is in a specific situation: it is "blanketed" with foreign radio stations...

[Answer] There are seven, eight, or nine stations that steadily broadcast programs in Slovenian...

[Question] ...Slovenians can look at foreign television programs, the borders are nearby, short-hop border traffic is in full swing. How does this affect the provision of information to our citizens?

[Answer] In the Socialist Alliance, we have a Press Council, to which belong the representatives of all information media, which originate in our country. We strive to keep this council more and more informed of all political events and problems, and of our stands, if we have such. We do not think that the press is to blame for everything that takes place in the LC, or in the Socialist Alliance. The press is only a reflection of what happens there. And another thing. The journalists have to obtain materials. We cannot talk about what has been written in Djilas' books when no one has even read them. Read the book, see the dirt, and then you can build up arguments, and say a little something: he wrote this and that, whereas the truth is that and this, you cannot just cry thief, thief.

[Question] In Slovenia, some time ago, the very controversial Kocbek text, which first appeared in Trieste, was published.

[Answer] True, it is very controversial when Kocbek states that at the end of the war, we unjustifiably killed 10,000 people--home guards and white guards. Kocbek thought that we would not publish it here. And we published his text, and even his own commentary, explanation, and our position. We showed that in the Slovenian region, battles were being fought all the way to the Autumn of 1945, and there still was no freedom, that the borders were undefined, that there was banditry, from the West, and now we know, that there was banditry from the East also. Why, I think that we ought to publish all hostile and emigre literature, but not for marketing it--there is no intent of popularizing the emigres--but for collecting it in university libraries so that it could be available to all of our students and to all citizens having an interest in seeing this literature, for study and for thorough reading. We say, once and for all: there is no embargo. Why must I speak in the name of the working people what fraudulent stuff this is, as though our people do not have the right attitude toward such rubbish. In that way, there'd be an end to hearing those dissident and certain other tendencies, behind which at times hides our creativity in culture and certain other sectors. In our country, it is mainly the state security and organs of internal affairs that deal with the hostile press, whereas I think that this is the business of science and learning. We must not fear any kinds of clashes in this ideological-political area. We must assertively express our stands, confront other positions with them, and we shall see whether we are right or not. We have to fight for our polity.

[Question] In concluding, there is another pretty personal question. You are known as a very humorous person. Have you lost your penchant for humor during these difficult and grave times?

[Answer] There were even more difficult times. Even in the partisans, it was "merry."

[Question] Then why is it that in the main, politicians are so serious?

[Answer] I think that joking and witticisms are not my monopoly and privilege in the political world. There are quite a few humorous politicians. Why, I think that at our meetings, there is a lot more humor than is written about...

[Question] Maybe the journalists do not dare, maybe they have some bad experiences...

[Answer] It is possible that they do not dare to tell jokes at the expense of some "great politician..."

[Question] You have collected your own caricatures, you know how to joke about your ownself. Once you said that the usual serious, nearly dour mien of our politicians probably contains some lack of confidence before the people.

[Answer] Yes, that is right, this is lack of confidence before the people. It is necessary to have confidence in the people, we must have confidence in them even when the going gets tough. When things go well, we all cite the fact that the working class has given its stamp of approval to that thing, or to this thing. For example, we achieved a platform for the Congress of Self-Managers, we had some remarks to make, but we were told that all of this had been checked out already. If it was approved, then why ask us, brother. It is necessary to develop democracy, the battle of opinions. If some person proceeds in some particular way of his own, he is not automatically on that other side from the one we are on. But in our country, it does happen frequently that the person who has something contrary to say--that person is automatically on the other side.

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WEST GERMAN COMMENT ON NEW BISHOP OF MARIBOR

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Jan 81 p 8

[Article datelined Maribor, in December, by Viktor Meier: "Choice of a Less Pliant Man as Bishop"]

[Text] On 21 December Franc Kramberger, the 44-year-old director of the Maribor Seminary was consecrated as the new bishop of Maribor (Marburg). By this elevation Slovenia's largest bishopric gained once again a statutory chief pastor. Kramberger's appointment as bishop is important politically as well. For over 2 years the bishopric had been administered by a capitular vicar, Suffragan Bishop Grmic. He followed a line not far removed from that of a "priest of peace." This stance made life difficult not only for his priests, most of whom disagreed with him, but also endangered the cohesion of the Catholic Church in Slovenia. Grmic made it possible for the regime to divide the bishops. With the election of the new pope and the subsequent appointment of the new Archbishop Sustar in Ljubljana (Laibach) as successor to the aged, now deceased Archbishop Pogacnik, it became clear that the church was not likely to lend support to the line followed by Grmic. The Vatican acted as was expected. The communist hierarchy's attitude, and especially Popular Front Chairman Ribicic's comment on the decision, was one of bitterness. Life with Grmic would have been more comfortable.

Bishop Kramberger projects the impression of a mild-mannered, still somewhat insecure and modest younger man who was taken aback by his appointment. But it is believed that beneath his mild demeanor lies strong determination.

The Maribor bishopric has been one of battles that were closely associated with national ascension and also, during World War II, with the threat to the Slovenes' national existence. Kramberger, a graduate of the Theological Seminary in Ljubljana, wrote his dissertation on one of his most important predecessors, Bishop Slomsek, who contributed importantly to the awakening of Slovene national consciousness in the middle of the 19th century and who in 1859 was instrumental in gaining the pope's and the emperor's consent for redrawing the boundaries of the bishopric along ethnic lines. The Slovene peasantry in Lower Styria fought for supremacy over the German middle class in the cities and the German nobility of rural estates. Since there were hardly any intellectuals, the people saw the priests as their natural leaders. This contributed to the almost spontaneous emergence of clericalism as the leading political force in Slovenia till World War II.

The communists can charge the priests of Lower Styria with anything but a lack of nationalist feeling; when national-socialist Germany occupied the territory in April 1941 and set up a sort of pre-annexation administration--as was done in Alsace or in Luxemburg--with the intention of germanizing it, one of its first acts was the forced expulsion of all priests to Croatia. But they were not left in peace even there: Some of them were killed by the Ustachi as Yugoslav protagonists. After the war this was followed by communist persecution. Every fifth priest in Lower Styria came to know communist prisons.

The church in Slovenia may have its problems, also in Kramberger's bishopric: a lack of priests and indifference, mainly among the younger generation. But the church has survived as an institution; deprived of its political influence, it has strengthened its moral stance. To this day a crisis situation and nervousness prevail in the ranks of the communist hierarchy. The church in Slovenia cannot, as in Croatia, claim to represent nationalism because conditions are different. But they need not remain so forever.

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